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ABSTRACT The 1996 welfare reform led to sweeping changes to the cen-
tral cash safety net program for families with children. Along with other
changes, the reform imposed lifetime time limits for receipt of cash welfare,
effectively ending its entitlement nature for these families. Despite dire pre-
dictions, previous research has shown that program caseloads declined and
employment increased, with no detectible increase in poverty or worsening of
child well-being. We reevaluate these results in light of the severe 2007–09
recession. In particular, we examine how welfare reform has altered the cycli-
cality of the response of caseloads and family well-being. We ﬁnd that use of
food stamps and noncash safety net program participation have become signif-
icantly more responsive to the economic cycle after welfare reform, rising more
when unemployment increases. By contrast, we ﬁnd no evidence that cash wel-
fare for families with children is more responsive, and some evidence that it
might be less so. We ﬁnd some evidence that poverty increases more with
increases in the unemployment rate after reform, and none that it increases less.
We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effects of reform on the cyclical responsiveness of food
consumption, food insecurity, health insurance, household crowding, or health.
T
he Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996 made sweeping changes to the central cash safety net program
in the United States. The Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program had provided cash beneﬁts to low-income, primarily
single-parent families with children since 1935 and had come to be almost
synonymous with “welfare.” After 60 years with minimal changes, Presi-
dent Bill Clinton made good on his pledge to “end welfare as we know it,”
signing the 1996 legislation and thereby eliminating AFDC and replacing
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we know it now, imposes stringent work requirements, sanctions for non-
compliance, and lifetime time limits for receipt of welfare. Importantly,
the imposition of time limits effectively ended the entitlement nature of
cash welfare for poor families with children.
In the wake of this landmark welfare reform legislation, a widespread
concern was that the new policy would lead to increases in poverty and
deprivation among disadvantaged families. Literally hundreds of studies
evaluated the impacts of welfare reform on family and child well-being. A
broad summary of that voluminous literature is that the reform led to a
significant reduction in welfare participation and an increase in female
employment, with little consistent evidence that it also led to an increase (or
a decrease) in poverty or contributed materially to the observed decline in
child poverty.
1 However, the literature also shows that the strong labor mar-
ket of the late 1990s, along with the dramatic expansion of “in work” aid for
low-income families with children through the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), may have softened the initial impact of welfare reform (Meyer and
Rosenbaum 2001, Grogger 2003). Thus, at the end of the great expansion of
the 1990s, cash welfare caseloads had fallen by more than 50 percent from
their peak in 1994, to levels not seen since 1970. Between 1992 and 2000,
the employment rate of single women with children increased by 15.3 per-
centage points, from 69.4 percent to 84.7 percent, and the child poverty rate
declined by 6.1 percentage points, from 22.3 percent to 16.2 percent.
Of course, the expansion of the 1990s eventually ended. The nation
entered a short recession in 2001, followed by a relatively weak expansion.
Then, in December 2007, what has been called the Great Recession began,
which was deeper and longer than any other postwar downturn to date.
In this contraction and its aftermath, the national unemployment rate
increased by more than 5 percentage points, from 5.0 percent in Decem-
ber 2007 to 10.1 percent in October 2009, exceeding the largest increase
previously seen in the postwar era, that during the deep, back-to-back
recessions of the early 1980s. Incomes are down, poverty is up, and par-
ticipation in government assistance to families through use of unemploy-
ment benefits and food assistance has risen substantially. By contrast,
TANF caseloads have remained relatively ﬂat.
Our paper enters at this point. We seek to evaluate the impact of welfare
reform on disadvantaged families in the Great Recession. It is well known
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1. Comprehensive reviews can be found in Blank (2002) and Grogger and Karoly
(2005). The research summarized there focuses on the effects of reform on program partici-
pation, income and earnings, consumption, child outcomes, and a host of other measures.
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also an important topic, but not one within the scope of this paper.
that economic downturns adversely affect employment, income, and family
well-being, and that they have larger negative impacts on those with less
education and skill (Hoynes 2000, Hines, Hoynes, and Krueger 2001). Here
we ask whether the impact of the economic cycle on disadvantaged families
has changed with welfare reform. With welfare today providing less protec-
tion than before, are economic shocks causing more-adverse outcomes? We
focus on the nonelderly and in particular on families with children. This is a
natural choice given that our paper studies the effects of reform of the cash
assistance system that is exclusively targeted to families with children.
2
In an effort to broadly capture the possible effects of reform, we look not
only at use of cash welfare but also at family well-being measures and other
aspects of the safety net. Outcomes we examine include poverty (both ofﬁ-
cial and alternative measures), earnings and income, participation in food
stamps, participation in Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and disability
income, receipt of child support or alimony income, whether individuals
live in public housing or get a rent subsidy, food consumption, food insecu-
rity, health insurance coverage, health status, measures of crowding (such
as “doubling up”), and the presence of single female-headed family units.
We use both administrative data and household survey data to assemble a
comprehensive picture of family well-being in the wake of welfare reform.
We begin in section I with a descriptive and expansive look at expan-
sions and contractions from 1979 to the present. For each contraction 
or expansion, we report data on changes in spending on government assis-
tance programs (cash welfare, unemployment insurance, and food assis-
tance), in spending on the EITC, in family employment and poverty, in
measures of housing stress, in health insurance coverage and access, and in
family consumption. In so doing, we pay particular attention to how the
changes during the recent recession compare with those during the early-
1980s recessions. In section II we step back and provide a brief description
of welfare and the safety net for low-income families more broadly, with a
focus on recent important changes.
The descriptive approach of the paper’s first two sections, although
informative about the basic facts, does not allow us to identify the role that
welfare reform has played in causing the observed changes in outcomes.
We turn to this question in section III, where we present our core ﬁndings
about how welfare reform has affected the relationship between the eco-
nomic cycle and family well-being among the disadvantaged. To identify
the impact of welfare, we take advantage of the rich variation across states
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econometric model is a basic state-year panel where we regress various
family outcomes on the unemployment rate, a measure of welfare reform,
and the interaction between the two. The estimated coefﬁcient on the inter-
action term identiﬁes how welfare reform has affected the impact of the
cycle on family well-being.
This approach allows us to estimate how an increase in a state’s unem-
ployment rate affects outcomes among the disadvantaged, and how those
impacts changed with the dramatic reform to welfare. We believe ours to
be the ﬁrst paper to address this issue. We utilize data from many sources
in order to provide a comprehensive evaluation. We start with adminis-
trative data on participation in AFDC and TANF and on food stamp
caseloads, to document the “first stage” of the policies. We then analyze
data from 30 years of the March Current Population Survey Supplement
(CPS), which allow us to examine impacts on various family and house-
hold measures of well-being, including earnings and income, poverty, liv-
ing arrangements and housing stress, program participation beyond
AFDC/TANF and food stamps, health insurance coverage, and health sta-
tus. Finally, we present results for food consumption, using data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, and for food insecurity, using data
from the food security supplements to the CPS.
In section IV we reexamine the effects of welfare reform and how wel-
fare participation responds to the business cycle. First, we brieﬂy touch on
what is known about the response of public assistance and the safety net to
the recession of 2001. Then we revisit the topic of reductions in welfare
participation with reform, and in particular whether they have been driven
by changes in eligibility (that is, by reduced access) or changes in take-up.
We then go on to explore what is known about those single, nonworking
women who before reform were at risk of being on welfare but are no
longer on welfare (known as “disconnected women” in a growing litera-
ture). Section V concludes.
Using both administrative and survey data, we ﬁnd that both food stamps
and a broader measure of safety net participation (one that excludes cash
welfare for families with children and Medicaid) have become more respon-
sive to the economic cycle after welfare reform. Although always counter-
cyclical, both of these measures increase more with unemployment after
welfare reform. All measures of poverty (ofﬁcial and our own alternative
measure) are also countercyclical, and the likelihood of having an income
under 150 percent of the ofﬁcial poverty threshold is signiﬁcantly more
countercyclical after reform. By contrast, there is no evidence that cash wel-
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evidence that it might be less so. We ﬁnd that reform has had no signiﬁcant
effects on the cyclical responsiveness of food consumption, food insecu-
rity, receipt of child support or alimony, receipt of SSI or disability insur-
ance beneﬁts, health insurance coverage, household crowding, or health.
I. The Business Cycle, the Safety Net, and Family Well-Being
In this section we examine the changes in government assistance and fam-
ily outcomes that have occurred historically across expansions and con-
tractions in the United States. Figure 1 traces our measure of the economic
cycle—the unemployment rate—annually from 1962 to 2009. During the
recent recession, which ofﬁcially began in December 2007, the unemploy-
ment rate rose from 5 percent to a peak of 10.1 percent in October 2009.
Although the recession ofﬁcially ended in June 2009, the unemployment
rate remains high, at 9.6 percent in September 2010 (seasonally adjusted).
In terms of the annual averages shown in ﬁgure 1, unemployment in that
recession increased from 4.6 percent in 2007 to 9.3 percent in 2009. In our
analysis we compare results for the recent recession with those for the early
1980s, when two recessions in quick succession led to an increase in the
annual unemployment rate from 5.8 percent in 1979 to 9.7 percent in 1982.
Figure 1 also depicts two measures of the poverty rate (the share of the
population living in poverty), also on an annual basis. We view the poverty
rate as a central measure of family well-being and thus rely on it heavily in
our work. Ofﬁcial poverty status in the United States is determined by
comparing total pre-tax family cash income with a poverty threshold,
which varies by family size, number of children, and the presence or
absence of elderly persons. (Thus, all persons in the same family have the
same poverty status.) In 2009 the poverty threshold for a family of four
(two adults, two children) was roughly $22,000. This measure of resources
has numerous drawbacks. Notably, there is no geographic variation in the
threshold, despite wide variation in costs and wages across regions, and
the thresholds are based on outdated household budgeting rules of thumb,
which fail to adjust for changes in many categories of expenses (such as
shelter, clothing, work-related expenses, medical expenses, and utilities)
and thus do not currently reﬂect actual needs. Also, the thresholds are
updated annually by the consumer price index for all urban consumers
(CPI-U), a measure of inﬂation that may not well capture changes in prices
paid by disadvantaged families caused by changes in the basket of goods
they consume. Further, family cash income is not a complete measure of
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stamps, housing subsidies, and housing vouchers), certain subtractions
from income (such as income and payroll taxes), and certain additions to
income (such as the EITC) made through the tax system. These limitations
in the ofﬁcial poverty deﬁnition have been noted by many, and a recent
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) panel made recommendations for
revisions (Citro and Michael 1995). Throughout the paper we make use, to
the fullest extent possible, of an alternative poverty deﬁnition using a com-
prehensive post-tax, post-transfer income concept. Of particular relevance
for our work is the measurement of noncash beneﬁts, the EITC, and taxes.
3
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3. The ofﬁcial poverty thresholds were developed in 1963 and 1964 and adopted in
1969, and ofﬁcial statistics are available back to 1959. The thresholds have been adjusted
each year to reflect changes in the cost of living, using the CPI-U, but otherwise have
changed little since their creation. The Census Bureau is developing a supplemental poverty
measure to be published in addition to the ofﬁcial measure. The supplemental measure is
intended to incorporate many of the suggestions of the NAS report on the poverty measure.
The Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics have long examined various alterna-
tive measures of both income and thresholds and have published various experimental series
(for example, Dalaker 2005); they have also explored whether the NAS recommendations
could be implemented (for example, Garner and Short 2008).
Percent Percent
Sources: See the appendix.
a. Rates are annual averages. Poverty rates are calculated as the share of all persons living in families 
with income below the official or the NAS alternative poverty line.
b. Measure uses the MSI-NGA-CE version of NAS tabulations. See the appendix for details.



















Figure 1. Unemployment Rate and Overall Poverty Rates, 1962–2009a
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stantially between the early 1960s and the mid-1970s, with shorter periods
of increases and decreases since that time. In the recent recession the ofﬁ-
cial poverty rate increased by 1.8 percentage points, from 12.5 percent in
2007 to 14.3 percent in 2009. The fact that unemployment did not improve
in late 2009 and early 2010 suggests that poverty will likely increase fur-
ther before it declines. The figure also plots, for the years for which data
are available (1999–2008), an alternative poverty measure suggested by
the NAS, which incorporates noncash transfers, taxes, out-of-pocket med-
ical expenditure, and work-related deductions in income and includes con-
sumption-based measures in the thresholds. Poverty by this measure is
higher than by the ofﬁcial measure but follows a very similar trend.
4
Given our focus on the effects of welfare reform on the nonelderly,
we show in figure 2 the official poverty rate for children, as well as that
for all nonelderly persons, from 1980 to 2009. In 2009, 15.1 percent of
nonelderly persons, and 20.7 percent of children, were poor. The ﬁgure
also plots the unemployment rate, with shading for years when contrac-
tions occurred,
5 and shows that poverty rates are countercyclical, rising
in downturns and falling in expansions. These simple time series do not
reveal any obvious evidence of a change in the cyclicality of poverty
following welfare reform; that is, it does not appear that poverty more
closely tracks the unemployment rate after 1996 than before. One can,
however, see that the strong expansion of the late 1990s was associated
with decreases in both the unemployment rate and poverty.
Table 1 provides more detail on economic circumstances and well-
being in contractions and expansions, both before and after welfare reform.
The contractions and expansions are the same as those depicted in fig-
ure 2. The first column reports changes during 1979–82, a period that
includes the two back-to-back recessions. The next four columns report
changes for the contractions of 1989–92, 2000–03, and 2007–09; in the
last of these, a few measures (EITC spending, NAS alternative poverty,
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4. In our own empirical analysis of the March CPS data below, we are able to construct
a consistent alternative poverty measure for calendar years 1980–86, 1988–90, and
1991–2008. Because of Census data limitations at the time of writing, the Census tabulations
for the NAS measure as well as our own tabulations of alternative poverty are not yet avail-
able for 2009.
5. The ofﬁcial NBER recession dating is monthly, whereas most of our analyses in the
paper rely on annual data. Therefore we constructed an annual series for contractions based
on the ofﬁcial monthly dates, augmented by examination of the peaks and troughs in the
national unemployment rate. See the appendix for a comparison of NBER monthly recession
dating and our annual contraction dating.
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columns present changes during the three expansions depicted in ﬁgure 2:
1982–89, 1992–2000, and 2003–07. We view these tabulations as interest-
ing and descriptive, but again it is difﬁcult to reach conclusions about how
cyclicality has changed because one cannot distinguish the cycle from the
aggregate trend.
The ﬁrst row of table 1 reports the change in the annual unemployment
rate in each contraction and expansion. During the 2007–09 recession, the
unemployment rate increased by 4.7 percentage points, compared with
an increase of 3.9 percentage points between 1979 and 1982 and even
smaller increases during the 1989–92 and 2000–03 contractions. The next
panel documents how spending on the key cash and near-cash govern-
ment assistance programs (the latter comprising food stamps, unemploy-
ment insurance, and the EITC) changed across cycles. Both food stamps
and (especially) unemployment insurance show countercyclical spending.
Of particular interest is the 68 percent increase in real food stamp spend-
ing per capita between 2007 and 2009. Expenditure for the EITC does not
appear to follow a countercyclical pattern, although with major expan-





Sources: See the appendix. 
a. Rates are annual averages. Poverty rates are calculated as the share of children or of nonelderly 
persons living in families with income below the official poverty line. Shading indicates years of labor 
market contraction as defined in the appendix.





Poverty rate: all nonelderly
Poverty rate: children
Annual unemployment rate
Figure 2. Unemployment Rate and Child and Nonelderly Poverty Rates, 1980–2009a












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12367-02a_Bitler_rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:15 AM  Page 80sions in the program in 1986, 1990, and 1993, it is hard to distinguish any
impact of the cycle (Eissa and Hoynes 2006).
Perhaps surprisingly, the data on cash welfare expenditure (AFDC
and TANF) do not show a clear countercyclical pattern. Cash welfare
payments per capita increased during the 1989–92 contraction (by 10 per-
cent) but decreased during the contractions of 1979–82 (by 14 percent),
2000–03 (17 percent), and 2007–09 (2 percent). However, the more com-
prehensive TANF total assistance measure, which includes cash and non-
cash assistance, increased by 8 percent in the 2007–09 recession.
6 Less
surprisingly, cash payments decreased during each of the three expansions.
Previous research shows that some of the decreases in periods of contrac-
tion are the result of structural, policy-driven declines in expenditure (for
example, expenditure was lower because of rules cutting eligibility in 1981
and because of welfare reform in the late 1990s) in excess of countercycli-
cal increases in expenditure. This illustrates the limitations of this exercise:
simple descriptive comparisons of expenditure across contractions and
expansions are not deﬁnitive in identifying the effects of welfare reform on
the responsiveness of the safety net.
We postpone until the next section a detailed discussion of welfare,
other safety net programs, and the recent reforms. However, to provide a
context for the material presented in the remaining panels of table 1, here
we present a demographic proﬁle of cash welfare recipients. In particular,
table 2 reports characteristics of families with any cash welfare income
(AFDC or general assistance) in 1995, on the eve of federal welfare
reform. For comparison, we also present the same characteristics for all
families with children in 1995 and for families receiving cash welfare at
the end of the period, in 2009.
7 In 1995 almost 70 percent of heads of
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6. After welfare reform, states had ﬂexibility to spend federal block grant funding on not
only cash assistance, but also other noncash aid such as subsidized child care, transportation,
and education and training. The total expenditure series includes spending from all sources.
We discuss this further below.
7. These calculations are based on the 1996 and 2010 March CPS, which collects infor-
mation on current living arrangements and on income, transfers, and health insurance cover-
age for the preceding calendar year. Like all sample surveys, the CPS relies on self-reports,
and as in many such surveys, income is underreported. The degree of underreporting varies
both over time and across types of income as well as by recipiency and total dollar amounts.
(Weinberg 2004 summarizes some of the issues; see also speciﬁc studies such as Meyer,
Mok, and Sullivan 2009, Wheaton 2007, and Bitler, Currie, and Scholz 2003.) In part
because of this concern about the validity of self-reports of income from public assistance
and other programs, we also present results using administrative counts.
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Table 2. Characteristics of Families Receiving Public Assistance Income in 1995 and
2009, and of All Families in 1995a
Percent except where stated otherwise
Families with Families with 
children receiving All families children receiving 
cash welfare, with children, cash welfare,
Characteristic 1995b 1995c 2009b
Heads of family
Percent white, non-Hispanic 39.0 69.7 37.5
Percent black, non-Hispanic 33.9 13.6 34.4
Percent Hispanic 21.5 12.0 23.9
Percent female 78.4 36.7 82.2
Percent with <12 years  40.5 15.8 33.8
education
Percent with exactly  34.0 31.8 33.4
12 years education
Percent with >12 years  25.5 52.4 32.8
education
Percent never married 37.6 8.8 45.1
Percent divorced, separated,  34.7 18.4 27.4
or widowed
Percent married 27.7 72.9 27.6
Average age (years) 33.9 38.2 35.4
Percent insured 96.6 85.6 94.4
Percent working last week 30.6 80.3 34.1
Percent out of the labor  56.0 14.3 49.1
force last week
Families
Percent in household receiving  86.5 14.4 82.1
food stamps
Percent in household in public  32.8 6.0 32.1
or subsidized housing
Percent in household owning  16.6 64.3 19.9
home
Percent with child insured 98.9 87.4 99.1
Sources: Authors’ tabulations of 1996 and 2010 March CPS data.
a. Demographics and living arrangements are as of the time of the survey (March 1996 or 2010);
income and program receipt refer to calendar year 1995 or 2009.
b. Families with at least one child and receiving public assistance income (AFDC, TANF, or general
assistance).
c. All families with at least one child.
12367-02a_Bitler_rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:15 AM  Page 82families with cash welfare income were unmarried single women, about
40 percent were non-Hispanic whites, 34 percent were non-Hispanic
blacks, and 22 percent were Hispanic.
8 These ﬁgures changed little between
1995 and 2009. Compared with all families with children, the welfare pop-
ulation is more likely to be black or Hispanic, less educated, unmarried,
and female headed, with the head out of the labor force. In addition,
table 2 shows that most families receiving cash welfare also participate in
other government programs: in 1995, 87 percent of these families received
food stamps, and 33 percent lived in government-subsidized housing. (Not
shown in the table is that 90 percent of the heads and 97 percent of the chil-
dren were on Medicaid—or, for the children only, the State Children’s
Health Insurance Program—13 percent received cash assistance through
the SSI program, and 65 percent participated in the free and reduced-price
school meals program.)
Historically, families do not mix welfare and work (31 percent of recip-
ients were working at the time of the 1995 survey, and 56 percent were out
of the labor force), but the tabulations for 2009 suggest that combining
welfare and work has increased somewhat since welfare reform.
9 Those
who did work before welfare reform tended to work in poorly paid occu-
pations (Burtless 1997). Also worth noting is that among a given entry
cohort into welfare, a large share will be on welfare for a short time, but 
a large share of the current welfare caseload is made up of long-term recip-
ients, who tend to be even less attached to the labor force than other
recipients (see, for example, Bane and Ellwood 1994). Ellwood (1986)
reports that 34 percent of first-time AFDC recipients had not worked in
the previous 2 years, and 18.4 percent of these new recipients had a dis-
ability that limited work.
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8. It may seem surprising that we ﬁnd just over a quarter of families receiving welfare to
have married heads. However, under AFDC, states could offer beneﬁts to support children
in two-parent families where the primary earner was unemployed (in 1995, these families
accounted for 7 percent of cases; U.S. House of Representatives 1996), and under TANF,
many of the eligibility rules distinguished far less between two- and one-parent families.
Further, because family structure is measured as of March whereas income is measured for
the preceding calendar year, some share of individuals may have gotten married after having
been on cash assistance.
9. In these tabulations, a family is identiﬁed as a welfare recipient if it received any pub-
lic assistance income (AFDC/TANF or other) during the previous calendar year. We mea-
sure employment as of the week before the survey. (We can also measure any employment
during the last calendar year.) Consequently, because one cannot tell from the CPS whether
people had earnings when they were also receiving cash assistance, the CPS does not allow
for identiﬁcation of simultaneous welfare and work status.
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changes across contractions and expansions for a broad array of outcomes
relevant for the welfare population. Data on most outcomes are not avail-
able for all time periods, and many are available only after welfare reform.
All of the poverty measures are strongly countercyclical. For example, the
ofﬁcial poverty rate for children increased by 5.5 percentage points in the
1979–82 recession, and by 2.7 percentage points between 2007 and 2009.
Poverty declined in two of the three periods of expansion, the exception
being the 2003–07 expansion, when child poverty increased by 0.4 per-
centage point. Extreme child poverty, deﬁned as the share of children in
families with income below 50 percent of the official poverty threshold,
declined across all expansions. The NAS alternative poverty measure seems
to fluctuate less with the cycle. (As noted above, the NAS alternative
poverty measure is not yet available for 2009, so the statistic for the recent
recession is of limited value.)
Employment of single mothers exhibits a procyclical pattern, declin-
ing by 3.9 percentage points in the recent recession, compared with 
1.9 percentage points in the 1979–82 contraction. This suggests a greater
sensitivity to the cycle after welfare reform, which is consistent with an
increase in rates of attachment to the labor market among potential wel-
fare recipients. We also consider a more comprehensive measure of
receipt of safety net benefits that includes a broad array of public assis-
tance programs (but excludes AFDC/TANF, general assistance, and
Medicaid). This broad safety net participation measure is very strongly
countercyclical, increasing by a striking 4.5 percentage points in the
recent contraction after declining in the 1992–2000 expansion by a sim-
ilar amount.
10
Mindful of the importance of looking at measures that capture well-
being rather than resources, in the remainder of the table we present
changes in consumption expenditure (in real 2009 dollars per capita from
the Consumer Expenditure Survey), in food insecurity, in “doubling up”
and homelessness, and in health insurance coverage and access. Our
consumption measures are for individuals in the lowest 20 percent of con-
sumer units by pre-tax income, and notably, changes in these measures do
not show a consistent pattern across the contractions and expansions. Food
insecurity, data for which are available only for the later period, shows an
84 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
10. This measure takes a value of 1 for any household where a member is reported as
participating in food stamps, SSI, public housing or rental subsidies, free or reduced-price
school lunches, or energy assistance during the calendar year before the survey.
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larly striking given that the data are available only through 2008.
11
The share of children living in a female-headed household and the share
“doubling up” (living in households with two or more families, a measure
of housing stress) also do not exhibit strong patterns across cycles. Curi-
ously, homelessness, data for which are available only for the most recent
period and for a sample of shelters, seems to have declined in the recent
recession, although the number of homeless families increased. Delay of or
failure to get medical care due to cost, a measure of health care access,
rises in both contractions for which data are available; health insurance
coverage, however, shows no clear cyclical trend.
To illustrate in more detail the degree of protection that cash welfare
and food stamps provide in recessions, the top panel of ﬁgure 3 shows the
total number of unemployed persons, the cash welfare (TANF) caseload,
and the food stamp caseload by month from January 2007 to the present.
We normalize all series to 1 in December 2007, the official start of the
recent recession, and demarcate the ofﬁcial end of the recession in June
2009.
12 The figure shows that food stamp caseloads have expanded sig-
nificantly with the recession whereas TANF caseloads have changed
very little. The middle panel of ﬁgure 3 depicts the same three series (sub-
stituting AFDC for TANF) for the second of the two early-1980s reces-
sions, which ofﬁcially began in July 1981, and the bottom panel does the
same for the recession that began in July 1990. These graphs suggest that
cash welfare caseloads are less responsive to the economic cycle than are
food stamp caseloads and that neither program responded much during the
1981–82 recession.
Finally, another way to assess the role of the safety net is to examine the
sources of income for the disadvantaged during a contraction. The top
panel of ﬁgure 4 shows the share of total income (which here includes both
cash income and the value of food stamps) by source for all households in
poverty in 1982 and 2008; the bottom panel provides the same information
for households in extreme poverty (income below 50 percent of the ofﬁcial
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11. Food security is a measure of households having enough nutritionally adequate and
safe foods or having assured ability to acquire acceptable foods in socially acceptable ways
(for example, not through emergency food supplies or scavenging). Haider (2006) describes
advantages and disadvantages of this measure of well-being, which contains a psychological
component.
12. These figures update earlier graphs from a presentation by LaDonna Pavetti,
“Responding to Increasing Need: Assessing TANF’s Responsiveness during Hard Eco-
nomic Times,” Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, June 3, 2010.
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Sources: See the appendix. 
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No. of unemployed
AFDC cases Food stamp cases
Figure 3. Unemployment, Cash Welfare Caseloads, and Food Stamp Caseloads in
Three Recessions
a
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Percent of total incomeb
Households below 100 percent of the poverty line
Households below 50 percent of the poverty line
Source: Authors’ calculations from 1983 and 2009 March CPS data.
a. Data refer to 1982 and 2008 calendar-year income. Samples include only households with children,
and poverty is evaluated at the household level. Percentages do not sum to 100 because some income
sources are excluded.




























































Figure 4. Composition of Income by Source for Households below the Ofﬁcial Poverty
Line, 1982 and 2008a
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13. We are unable to update this ﬁgure to 2009 because the amount of food stamps per
household has not yet been released by the Census Bureau as of this writing.
14. The share of income provided by food stamps might increase mechanically if fami-
lies leave welfare and do not replace all of their welfare income, because the food stamp pro-
gram reduces beneﬁts by 30 cents for each dollar of other income.
poverty threshold).13 This ﬁgure clearly shows the declining role of cash
welfare as a countercyclical income source for the poor and the increasing
roles played by food stamps, earnings, and SSI.
14
Several important points emerge from this analysis. Overall, use of a
broad measure of the safety net (excluding Medicaid and cash assistance for
families with children), poverty, food insecurity, and health care access show
strong countercyclical patterns. The nature of changes in demographic stress,
homelessness, and consumption across the cycle is less clear. Unfortunately,
many of the outcomes of interest exhibit either secular trends (for example,
children living with single female family heads, percent uninsured) or
policy-driven structural changes (for example, expansions in the EITC, wel-
fare reform–induced reductions in use of cash welfare), or both. These other
factors make it difﬁcult to draw conclusions from table 1 (or ﬁgure 3) con-
cerning cycles, the disadvantaged, and welfare reform, as it is hard to separate
the role of the aggregate cycle from that of other factors affecting the trends
in outcomes. To take just one example, it is well understood that, as alluded
to above, AFDC caseloads declined in 1981 as a result of changes in the ben-
eﬁt reduction rate that reduced eligibility for many recipients (Mofﬁtt 1992,
U.S. General Accounting Ofﬁce 1985). This obviously complicates the inter-
pretation of ﬁgure 3 and table 1. Rebecca Blank expresses our concerns well:
Note that the back-to-back recessions in the early 1980s caused a mild uptick in case-
loads, but this was quickly aborted when legislative changes in Reagan’s ﬁrst term ended
AFDC eligibility for about 15 percent of the caseload. . . . This policy change makes it
difﬁcult to do any quick “eyeball” comparisons between the recession effects of the early
1980s and the early 1990s on caseloads. (Blank 2001, p. 87)
In sum, the data in table 1 provide a useful description of changes in well-
being in the recent recession. However, to make more deﬁnitive conclu-
sions about how the cyclicality of outcomes has changed after welfare
reform, we defer to our regression results below, where we are able to sep-
arate out secular trends from the cycle.
II. The Elements of the Safety Net before and after Reform
Before discussing our regression results, we step back and provide some
more background on welfare and welfare reform. Cash welfare is not the
only government assistance program for low-income families with chil-
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we seek to understand how both cash welfare and the other elements of
the safety net may have affected family well-being. Therefore, here we
describe not only cash welfare and welfare reform but also, briefly, the
other safety net programs and their recent reforms.
Table 3 presents an overview of participation and spending in the cen-
tral cash and near-cash safety net programs for low-income families with
children. The two primary programs are TANF (the cash welfare program
that replaced AFDC as described above) and the food stamp program (now
called the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program). The food stamp
program is by far the larger of the two, especially since welfare reform: in
2009, 15 million families or single individuals received food stamps, at a
cost of $50 billion (all dollar ﬁgures in this paragraph are in current dol-
lars), compared with fewer than 2 million families receiving cash welfare,
at a cost of $9 billion. The EITC provides tax-based aid for low-income
working families with children, and in 2008, the most recent year for
which data are available, 25 million families received the EITC, at a total
tax cost of $51 billion. SSI is another cash welfare program, one that pri-
marily serves poor elderly and disabled adults but is also received by dis-
abled children in some poor families. Finally, unemployment compensation
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Table 3. Expenditure on and Participation in Cash or Near-Cash Safety Net Programs,




beneﬁt Average removed 
payments monthly from
(millions beneﬁt poverty
Program Thousands of dollars) (dollars) (millions)
Cash welfare (TANF)
b (cases) 1,796 9,324 397 0.8
Food stamps (cases) 15,232 50,360 276 2.2
EITC
c (tax ﬁling units) 24,757 50,669 171 2.6
Cash welfare (SSI, nonaged caseload) 6,407 41,023 517 1.0
Unemployment compensation (persons)
Regular state beneﬁts n.a. 79,600 1,335 n.a.
Extended beneﬁts n.a. 7,574 n.a. n.a.
Emergency beneﬁts n.a. 44,246 n.a. n.a.
Total 5,757 131,420 n.a. n.a.
Sources: For children removed from poverty see Sherman (2009). For all other sources see the appendix.
a. Data refer to calendar 2009 and are in 2009 dollars except where noted otherwise.
b. Data refer to ﬁscal 2009.
c. Data refer to 2008 and are in 2008 dollars.
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replacement program in recessions. This program differs from the others in
that it is a social insurance program, with eligibility determined by work
history and not conditioned on current income. Unemployment compensa-
tion consists of several different programs, including regular state beneﬁts,
state extended beneﬁts (which generally kick in when a state’s unemploy-
ment rate exceeds a preset threshold), and the federally ﬁnanced emergency
benefits program (which is currently in place and extends benefits well
beyond the normal maximum period of receipt of 26 weeks). In 2009, on
average, about 6 million persons in a given week received some form of
unemployment compensation, at a cost of over $131 billion for the year).
Average monthly payments per recipient family in 2009 were $397
for TANF and $276 for food stamps. EITC credits in 2008 averaged
$2,046 per year, or $171 per month. By contrast, regular state weekly
unemployment compensation payments in the fourth quarter of 2009
averaged $308 per week ($1,335 per month). The final column in table 3
reports results from a recent Center for Budget and Policy Priorities
study (Sherman 2009) on the number of children that each of these pro-
grams lifted out of poverty in 2005. The EITC leads, having lifted 
2.6 million children out of poverty, followed by food stamps at 2.2 mil-
lion, and then by SSI and TANF, which each removed about 1 million
children from poverty.
15
Our analysis focuses on cash welfare (TANF) and food stamps, but in
our analysis of family income and poverty, we indirectly analyze the
impacts of all the programs listed in table 3 as well as broader measures
of any safety net use that encompass other programs, such as the free
and reduced-price school lunch program and public housing and rental
vouchers.
16
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15. These calculations for poverty alleviation perform the hypothetical exercise of elim-
inating one program at a time while maintaining all of the others. The exact numbers differ
somewhat from study to study; for another set of estimates see Meyer (2010). Of course,
EITC eligibility rules mean most EITC beneﬁts are received by individuals near the poverty
line, thus making it more likely for the EITC to lift families out of poverty. Other programs
such as AFDC/TANF have eligibility thresholds further from the poverty line, making it less
likely they will lift families out of poverty.
16. Other cash or near-cash programs of relevance for families with children include
public housing and vouchers and rent subsidies, other nutrition programs (the National
School Lunch and Breakfast programs, WIC), energy assistance, and state general assistance
programs. In addition, Medicaid provides health insurance for poor children and families,
and higher-income (but still low-income) children are eligible for SCHIP.
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Net Programs
CASH WELFARE. At the national level, cash welfare for low-income fam-
ilies started with the AFDC program, created by the Social Security Act
of 1935. The program was jointly funded by the state and federal gov-
ernments (with a higher federal matching rate for lower-income states).
States had authority to set benefit levels, but the federal government
dictated most of the remaining eligibility and benefit rules. A family
was eligible if it satisfied income and asset tests, and assistance was pri-
marily limited to single women with children.
17 The benefits were struc-
tured in a manner typical for income support programs: if a family had
no income, it received the maximum benefit or “guarantee.” As the fam-
ily’s earnings (or allowable income) increased, the benefit was reduced
by the benefit reduction rate or clawback rate, which created an implicit
tax rate on earned income. Historically, this rate has varied between 
67 and 100 percent, providing a strong disincentive for work (Moffitt
1983). This fact attracted little attention in the program’s early decades,
when very few mothers participated in the labor market. Over time,
however, concerns about the work disincentive (and about the disincen-
tive to form two-parent families) grew, and interest in reforming the
program followed.
The modern era of welfare reform began in the early 1990s, when many
states were granted waivers to modify their AFDC programs.
18 About half
of the states implemented some sort of welfare waiver between 1992 and
1995. On the heels of this state experimentation, the Personal Responsibil-
ity and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) was enacted in
1996, replacing AFDC with TANF. The key elements of reform in the
state waivers and the TANF legislation included work requirements, life-
time time limits on the duration of welfare receipt, ﬁnancial sanctions for
failing to adhere to the work requirements or other rules, and enhanced
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17. More precisely, a family had to show that the children were deprived of parental
support by the absence, incapacitation, or (in some states and some periods) unemployment
of one parent. In practice, throughout its history more than 90 percent of the AFDC caseload
consisted of single mothers (see U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2008,
appendix A, table TANF-1). Large changes in the mid-1960s expanded the program consid-
erably for unmarried mothers.
18. The 1990s reforms were by no means the first reforms of AFDC. Without a doubt,
however, they were the furthest reaching, and today “welfare reform” generally refers to
those changes.
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sition from welfare to work and to reduce dependence on cash welfare.
The time limits were an important provision in that they eliminated the
entitlement nature of the program. States have considerable discretion in
setting policies under TANF, but by federal law, programs must include
work requirements and lifetime time limits of 5 years or less for the vast
majority of recipients.
20 The character of federal funding also changed
from an (uncapped) matching formula under AFDC to a (capped) block
grant under TANF.
An advantage for identifying the effects of these recent reforms is that
both the timing and the type of welfare reform varied considerably across
states in the 1990s. Some states reformed their programs through waivers,
in advance of the 1996 law. Other states reformed their programs later,
when required by PRWORA, with the last state implementing TANF in
January 1998. Under PRWORA, states continue to vary in their length
of time limits, types of sanctions, and so on. For example, Gilbert Crouse
(1999) reports that before PRWORA, 15 states had waivers approved with
time limits on receipt, 19 had waivers approved that enhanced their earn-
ings disregards, and 28 had waivers approved that included sanctions for
noncompliance. Although PRWORA imposed time limits for federally
funded welfare on all states, some states use their own funds to pay bene-
ﬁts beyond the federal time limit. This state variation in the timing and
severity of reform has been widely exploited in empirical studies of wel-
fare reform (see reviews in Blank 2002 and Grogger and Karoly 2005),
and we will make use of this variation as well.
TANF provides benefits only to families with quite low incomes, and
eligibility cutoffs and beneﬁt levels leave recipients substantially below
the poverty line. Before welfare reform, under AFDC, the median state
provided beneﬁts to families with income up to 70 percent of the poverty
guideline, and the median state’s benefit level for a family of three was
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19. Enhanced earnings disregards refer to changes in the beneﬁt formula to reduce the
rate at which earnings are “taxed” by the welfare system and thus increase incentives to
work. Other changes adopted by some states include expanding eligibility for two-parent
families, “family caps” (freezing beneﬁts at the level associated with current family size),
and imposing residency and schooling requirements for unmarried teen recipients. For a
detailed discussion of the policy changes, see Blank and Haskins (2001) and Grogger and
Karoly (2005).
20. The 5-year lifetime limit on receipt of federal TANF assistance applies to adult-
headed families, but the law allowed states to exempt from this limit for hardship reasons up
to 20 percent of their total caseload.
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tives 1996).
21 Beneﬁts varied widely across states; for example, in 1996
maximum beneﬁts for a family of three were $120 per month in Missis-
sippi and $607 per month in California. As part of their welfare reforms, to
improve ﬁnancial incentives to make the transition from welfare to work,
many states decreased the implicit tax rate on earned income within the
TANF program, allowing individuals to have much higher earnings before
losing all their welfare beneﬁts. Despite these expansions in the amount of
earned income that families could keep while on welfare, total beneﬁts
remain low.
FOOD STAMPS. The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, like
TANF, is a means-tested program (eligible families and individuals must
satisfy income and asset tests) in which beneﬁts are subject to a ceiling and
reduced with earned income. The similarities end there, however. First, the
food stamp program is a federal program, with all funding (except for
50 percent of administrative costs) provided by the federal government.
Second, unlike virtually all other cash assistance programs, food stamps
are not limited to certain targeted groups such as families with children,
the elderly, and the disabled. Third, the beneﬁt reduction rate is relatively
low (30 cents per dollar earned), and the income eligibility threshold is rel-
atively high (130 percent of the poverty guideline). The lower beneﬁt
reduction rate means that the food stamp program serves not only the
nonworking poor (those receiving cash welfare) but also the working
poor. Recipients are allowed to use their benefits to buy a wide array of
food items (although not prepared foods), and studies show that the
behavioral response to food stamps is similar to the response to cash
(Fraker and others 1992, Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2009, Ohls and others
1992). Food stamp benefits today are disbursed with debit cards rather
than paper vouchers as in the past.
Unlike cash welfare, the food stamp program has remained relatively
unchanged over time. The income eligibility cutoff and beneﬁts are adjusted
for changes in prices each year, and the actual beneﬁt formula (and thus the
implicit tax rate) has changed very little over time. However, important lim-
itations to the program were introduced under PRWORA: legal immigrants
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21. Note that eligibility for many federal safety net programs is based on poverty guide-
lines, which are simpliﬁed versions of the Census poverty thresholds, varying by fewer
dimensions and made available earlier in the year. Poverty guidelines vary by number of
persons and are different for Alaska and Hawaii than for the rest of the states and the District
of Columbia. See aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/ﬁgures-fed-reg.shtml.
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50 could receive only 3 months of food stamps in any 3-year period.
22 The
2002 farm bill reinstated beneﬁts for legal immigrants, and the 2009 federal
stimulus bill temporarily suspended the 3-month limit for childless, jobless
adults. The stimulus bill also provided a temporary increase in maximum
beneﬁts of roughly $25 per month, at a cost of $6 billion in 2009 (Pavetti and
Rosenbaum 2010).
Since welfare reform (and perhaps even before it), the food stamp pro-
gram is unambiguously the key safety net program and the only one that
is “universal” (that is, based only on economic need) and that has a fully
funded entitlement. Caseloads and benefits adjust automatically with
demand (increasing in recessions), and costs are uncapped.
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE. As already noted, unemployment insurance
is a social insurance program that provides temporary and partial earn-
ings replacement for involuntarily unemployed individuals with a recent
employment history. As a social insurance program, unemployment insur-
ance is not means tested, and eligibility is a function of earnings history.
States administer their programs and set payroll taxes and beneﬁt levels.
Workers’ wages are subject to tax while employed, and unemployed work-
ers receive beneﬁts for a ﬁxed duration, with replacement rates (the ratio of
benefits to most recent earnings) averaging 47 percent since 1995 (U.S.
Department of Labor 2010). The extended beneﬁt program extends receipt
of unemployment compensation beyond the 26-week maximum when
state unemployment rates or the share of the insured population claiming
benefits is high. Funding for the extended program is shared by the
states and the federal government. In most major downturns, Congress
has enacted emergency extensions to unemployment insurance, such as
the current program, which in most states extends beneﬁts up to 99 weeks.
Recently, these emergency extensions have been fully federally funded.
Although unemployment compensation plays a central role in reces-
sions, it is often not considered part of the safety net because it primarily
provides insurance and is funded through worker contributions. We men-
tion it here for three reasons. First, given the increase in employment
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22. Technically, the 3-months-in-3-years limitation applied to able-bodied adults aged
18–49 with no dependents who were not working, in a work program, or doing workfare.
Individuals are exempt if they are caring for a child, are unable to work, or are pregnant.
States can exempt 15 percent of individuals and can get this provision waived if the state
unemployment rate is above 10 percent or if the state is eligible for state extended unem-
ployment beneﬁts or there are not enough jobs.
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(see the discussion of ﬁgure 6 below), unemployment compensation may
be increasing in importance for low-income families. Second, although
the insurance is not means tested, replacement rates fall as earnings rise,
providing greater protection for lower-wage workers. Third, the emer-
gency federal beneﬁt extensions tend to be explicitly countercyclical and
are passed by Congress in response to bad economic times. Although these
emergency programs are typically short lived, when in effect they account
for a large share of total spending on unemployment compensation. Table 3
shows that in 2009, emergency beneﬁts were about $44 billion, compared
with a combined $87 billion for regular and extended beneﬁts.
THE TRANSITION FROM OUT-OF-WORK TO IN-WORK ASSISTANCE. As discussed
above, the EITC is one of the most costly cash or near-cash assistance pro-
grams. It functions as an earnings subsidy and as such is extended only to
working families. The expansion of the EITC, facilitated through tax acts in
1986, 1990, and 1993, has featured prominently in the movement toward
more “in-work” assistance in the safety net. However, the emergence of
TANF has also been an important part of this transition. Virtually all TANF
policies—the work requirements, the time limits, and the lowering of the
beneﬁt reduction rate—are designed to increase work. In addition, under
TANF, states have the flexibility to use their federal block grant funding
toward assistance other than periodic cash beneﬁts: examples include child
care subsidies as well as transportation, training, and diversion payments.
23
To illustrate the importance of these trends, ﬁgure 5 shows real spending
per capita from 1980 to 2009 for families receiving cash grants through
AFDC/TANF as well as total TANF expenditure per capita and total EITC
tax cost per capita. (We also show spending on food stamps per capita
because this program, too, serves the working poor.) The expansion of the
EITC between 1986 and 1998, coupled with the decline in cash welfare
expenditure beginning with the waivers of the early 1990s, represents a
tremendous change in the incentives faced by low-income families with
children. Importantly, the post–welfare reform trend in total TANF expen-
diture presents a somewhat different picture concerning welfare funding
than the trend for cash grants only—in fact, total funding has been more or
less constant (in real terms) over the last 10 or more years. Unfortunately, the
state reporting requirements for noncash TANF expenditure are minimal,
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23. Diversion payments are one-time payments made in lieu of monthly beneﬁt pay-
ments at the recipient’s request.
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spent on.
24 Nonetheless, these changes illustrate an important transition
from out-of-work aid to in-work aid for low-income families with children.
The result of these policy changes, coupled with the strong labor market
of the late 1990s, was a historic increase in employment for single women
with children. Figure 6 presents, for 1980–2009, the percentages of three
groups of women aged 20–58 with any weeks of work in the last year: sin-
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24. In the March CPS from 2001 to 2009, individuals were asked whether they had
obtained transportation assistance or child care assistance so that they could work or go to
school or training; they were also asked whether they had obtained job readiness training or
attended a job search class or job club or participated in GED classes or a community service
job as a condition of receiving cash assistance. We combined these into two household-level
variables. Although these activities need not all be funded by TANF, surely some are. From
2000 to 2008, 2.5 percent of households included someone getting child care assistance or
transportation assistance; 3.4 percent of households had someone in job readiness, job
search, GED classes, or community service, compared with 3.8 percent of households in
which one or more members received public assistance income. Furthermore, most of the
households with cash welfare did not get either of the two other supports, and vice versa;
among households with a child under 18, only 30 percent of those getting cash welfare had
someone getting one of these other noncash beneﬁts, while of those getting the noncash ben-
















Sources: See the appendix.
a. Shading indicates years of labor market contraction as defined in the appendix. 
1985 1995 2005 1990 2000
Figure 5. Real Expenditure per Capita on Cash and Near-Cash Safety Net Programs,
1980–2009
a
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in the family, and single women without children in the family. Between
1992 and 2000 the employment rate of single women with kids rose by
15 percentage points; the other groups saw minimal changes. This trend
suggests that outcomes for these single-woman-headed families will be
more procyclical, given their increased connection to the labor market.
II.B. Cycles and Participation in Safety Net Programs
Figure 7 presents cash welfare and food stamp caseloads from 1980 to
2009. These data come from administrative sources rather than self-reports
from household surveys (see the data appendix for details). To account for
changes in population over this period, we show the ratio of the caseload to
the total population.
25 Several observations can be made. First, throughout
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25. The caseload is essentially a count of families or households, whereas the denomi-
nator is a count of persons. Although it might be more intuitive to put the number of recipi-
ents in the numerator, the caseload measure is more commonly used to abstract away from
changes in the size of families receiving beneﬁts. In practice, trends in the ratio of recipients









Source: Authors’ calculations from 1981–2010 March CPS data.
a. Employment is measured annually and defined as having worked any weeks during the calendar year 
before the survey year. The sample includes women aged 20–58.
1985 1995 2005 1990 2000
Figure 6. Female Employment Rate by Marital Status and Presence of Children,
1980–2009
a
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food stamps than received cash welfare. Second, cash welfare caseloads
dramatically declined in the period around welfare reform and have
remained low since. Third, compared with cash welfare, the food stamp
caseload shows a stronger countercyclical tendency, at least during the
early part of the period.
26 Fourth, since 2000 the trend in the TANF caseload
bears little relationship to the national business cycle. Notably, the TANF
caseload increased by very little in the recent recession, as ﬁgure 3 showed,
despite unemployment rates reaching over 10 percent in many states.
27
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26. Over the early 2000s, and culminating in provisions included in the 2002 farm bill,
the U.S. Department of Agriculture implemented a number of provisions to expand food
stamp access by allowing more state policy choices in recertiﬁcation and reporting and fund-
ing some outreach. Klerman and Danielson (2009) look at the effects of these changes and
changes in the labor market on food stamp caseloads through 2004.
27. Toward the end of the period depicted in ﬁgure 7, in order to remain in compliance
with various TANF requirements, many states moved portions of their caseloads off TANF
and into new, “solely state-funded” programs. Data collected by LaDonna Pavetti of the
Center for Budget and Policy Priorities suggest that these programs are relatively small and











Percent of total population
Sources: See the appendix.
a. Shading indicates years of labor market contraction as defined in the appendix. 
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Figure 7. Cash Welfare and Food Stamp Caseloads, Administrative Data, 1980–2009a
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ing Medicaid and cash welfare for families with children; see table 1), which
we construct from the 1981–2010 March CPS data. Other than an increase
in the early 1990s, followed by a decline, this more comprehensive measure
of safety net participation also shows a fair amount of cyclical variation.
28
Why might it make sense that the food stamp program and our broader
measure of the non-AFDC/TANF, non-Medicaid safety net are more coun-
tercyclical than cash welfare? As mentioned above, the implicit tax rates in
cash welfare are high, much higher than those in the food stamp program.
It is much more common for families with food stamps to also have earned
income, whereas this is relatively uncommon for cash welfare recipients
(see table 2).
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28. We also include household participation in cash welfare and food stamps, as mea-
sured in the CPS, in ﬁgure 8. We ﬁnd it encouraging that the trends in participation are so
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Source: Authors’ calculations from 1981–2010 March CPS data.
a. Samples include only households with children, and program participation is evaluated at the 
household level. Shading indicates years of labor market contraction as defined in the appendix. 
b. Households in which someone participated in food stamps, the free or reduced-price school lunch 
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Figure 8. Multiple Safety Net Program Participation, 1980–2009a
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measures (employment-to-population ratios or employment growth) and, alternatively, GDP
growth, which maps more naturally onto the ofﬁcial recession dating. Although the magni-
tudes differ, the qualitative conclusions are similar to those reported here.
One should be cautious about drawing conclusions from national trends,
however. The problem, as noted in section I, is that it is difﬁcult to distin-
guish between changes due to labor market ﬂuctuations and changes due to
reforms in the programs themselves. For example, the fall in the cash wel-
fare caseload in the late 1990s has been shown to be a function of both
the strong economy and welfare reform (for example, see Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers 1997, Blank 2001, and Ziliak and others 2000). To sepa-
rate out the impact of welfare reform from labor market ﬂuctuations, our
empirical model will use disaggregated data and take advantage of rich
variation in cycles and reform across states and time.
III. Welfare Reform and the Impact of the Business Cycle on
Family Well-Being
In this section we present our central empirical results on the impact of
welfare reform on family well-being over the business cycle. These are
new results that build on the models used in two separate literatures: the
first examines the impact of the cycle on family economic outcomes and
on different demographic groups (for examples, see Hoynes 2000 and
Hines, Hoynes, and Krueger 2001), and the second the impacts of welfare
reform (see reviews by Blank 2002 and Grogger and Karoly 2005). Clearly,
the fact that the safety net provides less than perfect insurance implies that
a recession will lead to reductions in family well-being, as measured by
increases in poverty, reductions in consumption, increases in doubling up,
and so on. What we want to examine is how welfare reform has affected
that tendency.
A standard approach in both of these literatures is to use variation
across states to distinguish the impact of labor market cycles from that
of policy changes. We adopt that approach here as well. In particular,
we estimate the following model:
where s indexes states, t indexes years, UR is the unemployment rate, and
REFORM is a measure of welfare reform.
29 Our equation controls for state
() 1 y UR REFORM UR
REFORM
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12367-02a_Bitler_rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:15 AM  Page 100ﬁxed effects (γs), year ﬁxed effects (λt), and linear time trends for each
state (ηst). When we use household survey data, we also control for demo-
graphics (Xist, where i indexes households). Standard errors allow for arbi-
trary correlation within states. The main speciﬁcations for administrative
caseloads are at the monthly level, and for them t denotes months rather
than years.
We begin by analyzing the administrative caseload data on AFDC/
TANF and food stamps and then move on to a wide range of family well-
being measures based on the March CPS. Using the CPS, we examine
impacts on ofﬁcial poverty, our own alternative measure of poverty, pro-
gram participation (single programs as well as multiple programs), living
arrangements (female-headed families), employment among female heads
of family units, measures of housing stress (doubling up, households con-
taining subfamilies, and others), health insurance coverage, receipt of child
support or alimony, and general health. Finally, we present estimates for
food insecurity and, using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
family food consumption. Caseload models are weighted by the total
population, and the survey data models are weighted using the survey-
provided weights.
The model controls for a main effect for welfare reform and a main
effect for labor markets (the unemployment rate). The parameter of inter-
est is δ, the interaction between the reform variable and the unemployment
rate, which measures how the impact of the cycle on outcome y changes
with welfare reform. With controls for fixed state effects and fixed time
(year or month) effects, our estimates are identiﬁed off of changes within
states over time. This type of model is commonly known as a difference-
in-differences model.
30
This model, by controlling for an unrestricted time trend (λt), captures
any elements that are common to all states in a given year. A downside of
this approach is that the time effects absorb some features of the national
cycle. However, the beneﬁt of this approach is that it allows us to identify
the impacts of welfare reform separately from labor market ﬂuctuations.
To illustrate the variation we are using, ﬁgure 9 presents a series of scatter-
plots of state data in which each state’s population is represented by the
size of the circle centered on the data point for that state. The horizontal
MARIANNE P. BITLER and HILARY W. HOYNES 101
30. Our central parameter, on the interaction between the unemployment rate and wel-
fare reform, would still be identiﬁed if reform were captured by a national pre-versus-post-
1996 variable (because the unemployment rate still varies by state). However, we use state
variation in reform, which we view as a more credible source of identiﬁcation.
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Food stamp caseload, 2007–09
Child poverty, 2007–09
Figure 9. Change in Unemployment Rate, Change in Welfare Caseloads, and Change
in Child Poverty during Labor Market Contractions, by State
a
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Sources: See the appendix.
a. The center of each circle plots the change in the unemployment rate and the percent change in 
caseloads or the child poverty rate for one U.S. state between the peak and the trough of the indicated 
contraction. Circle sizes are proportional to state populations. Official child poverty is calculated by the 
authors using the 1980, 1983, 2008 and 2010 March CPS and family-level poverty. 
b. Food stamp caseloads are not available for 1979, so the percentage change in the caseload between 
1980 and 1982 is shown instead.
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Food stamp caseload, 1980–82b
Child poverty, 1979–82
Figure 9. Change in Unemployment Rate, Change in Welfare Caseloads, and Change
in Child Poverty during Labor Market Contractions, by State (Continued)
12367-02a_Bitler_rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:15 AM  Page 103axis in each panel plots the change in state annual unemployment rates
(in percentage points) over a contraction, and the vertical axis a change in
a state outcome (in percent) over the same period. The ﬁrst three panels
present data for 2007–09, and the next three panels for 1979–82. For each
cycle we show the percent change in cash welfare caseloads per capita
(top panels), the percent change in food stamp caseloads per capita (mid-
dle panels),
31 and the percent change in ofﬁcial child poverty rates (bottom
panels). We have forced the scales to be the same for each of the two
contractions for each outcome to provide better comparisons across
contractions. The figure reveals considerable variation in the depth of
the recessions across states. For example, between 2007 and 2009, state
changes in the unemployment rate ranged from about 1 to 7 percentage
points, and the change in child poverty varied from a reduction of 25 per-
cent to an increase of nearly 100 percent. Further, the ﬁgure shows a posi-
tive correlation between the severity of a recession and the increase in
ofﬁcial child poverty and program caseloads per capita.
We explore the effects of three measures of welfare reform. First, we
use a state pre-versus-post design where REFORM equals 1 if the state has
implemented a waiver or has implemented TANF, and zero otherwise.
32
Second, we use an explicit categorization of states based on their TANF
and waiver policies, focusing on two policy dimensions: the length of time
limits and the severity of sanctions. We adopt definitions and data from
Caroline Danielson and Jacob Klerman (2004) in constructing these
variables.
33 We define time limits as short (less than 48 months), long
(48 months or longer), or adult (time limits remove only adults from aid),
with the omitted group being state-year cells with no time limits (either pre-
PRWORA AFDC rules or no time limit under TANF). We deﬁne ﬁnancial
sanctions as full (immediate, full family sanction) or gradual (gradual,
full family sanction), with the omitted group being weak sanctions (either
AFDC sanctions or, under TANF, sanctions no more stringent than the
AFDC sanctions).
104 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
31. Because our data on food stamp caseloads begin in 1980, the second middle panel
measures the percent change in food stamp caseloads between 1980 and 1982, but the
change in unemployment rates from 1979 to 1982.
32. Whereas the timing and the presence of waivers vary considerably across states,
TANF implementation varies minimally, as all states implemented TANF in late 1996,
1997, or 1998. See table 1 of Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes (2006) for implementation dates
and an example of a paper using this identiﬁcation strategy.
33. We thank Caroline Danielson of the Public Policy Institute of California for gener-
ously providing us with their data and coding.
12367-02a_Bitler_rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:15 AM  Page 104With the administrative monthly caseload data, we use the policies in
place that month. For CPS outcomes measured over the last calendar
year, such as program participation, income, poverty, and health insur-
ance coverage, the main reform variable is measured as the share of the
past calendar year during which reform was in place, and the time limit
and sanction policies are coded according to what was in place in Decem-
ber of the preceding year. For the other outcomes measured at the time
of the CPS survey (living arrangements, health status), welfare reform 
is measured by whether the policy was in place as of March of the sur-
vey year.
III.A. Safety Net Caseloads
Table 4 presents estimates of the model using administrative data on
participation in the cash welfare and food stamp programs. The depen-
dent variable is caseloads per capita at the state-month-year level for
1980 through 2009. State monthly unemployment rates are seasonally
adjusted (but the results are very similar if we use non–seasonally adjusted
unemployment). We view the results here as a sort of “first stage”: they
are useful to establish the basic relationship between welfare reform and
the cyclicality of safety net programs for low-income families. Addi-
tionally, these caseloads are measures from administrative data and 
do not suffer from underreporting. Thus, they provide us with a valuable
benchmark for understanding whether the underreporting documented
by Bruce Meyer, Wallace Mok, and James Sullivan (2009) and others
has implications for analysis using state-year panels with state and year
fixed effects.
34 Finally, considerable attention has been given to the 
rise in food stamp caseloads in the recent recession,
35 yet no prior
research has identified whether welfare reform contributed in any way
to that rise.
Table 4 reports the coefﬁcients on the state unemployment rate and the
interaction between the unemployment rate and welfare reform. We pre-
sent three speciﬁcations, one for each of the reform variables we discuss
above. The dependent variable is the ratio of the caseload to the population
(multiplied by 100), and the unemployment rate is measured in percent.
MARIANNE P. BITLER and HILARY W. HOYNES 105
34. Weinberg (2004) discusses a host of such studies related to underreporting in the
CPS and other Census surveys; Wheaton (2007) documents underreporting of beneﬁt receipt
in the CPS.
35. Jason DeParle and Robert Gebeloff, “Food Stamp Use Soars, and Stigma Fades,”
The New York Times, November 29, 2009.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12367-02a_Bitler_rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:15 AM  Page 106For cash welfare caseloads (column 4-1), the coefficient of 0.06 implies
that a 1-percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate leads to 
an increase in the scaled AFDC/TANF caseload-population ratio of 0.06,
which, relative to the mean of 1.2, implies an effect size of 4.7 percent.
Interestingly, food stamp caseloads (column 4-4) show a similar effect
size: the coefﬁcient of 0.17 scaled by the mean of 3.5 implies an effect size
of 4.9 percent.
A negative coefficient on the interaction between the unemployment
rate and reform implies that welfare reform led to a reduction in the
cyclicality of program participation, and a positive coefficient implies
an increase (since program participation is expected to be, and is, coun-
tercyclical). We expect that the impact of short time limits on cyclical-
ity should exceed (in magnitude) that of long time limits, and both
should be larger in magnitude than the effect of the omitted group of no
time limits. Adult time limits are generally the least stringent of the
three; however, this measure ignores the length of the time limit, which
also might be important. We expect the impact of full sanctions on
cyclicality to be greater in magnitude than the impact of gradual sanc-
tions, and both should be larger than the effect of the omitted group of
no sanctions.
With the exception of the “any reform” speciﬁcation, the results for
AFDC/TANF caseloads (columns 4-1 to 4-3) imply that welfare reform is
associated with a decrease in the cyclicality of cash welfare. With the
exception of the adult time limit, the results for food stamp caseloads
(columns 4-4 to 4-6) imply that welfare reform led to an increase in the
cyclicality of food stamp receipt. However, only 4 of the 12 interaction
coefﬁcients reach statistical signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level or better,
and only 3 do so at the 5 percent level or better. Clearly, there is no evi-
dence that welfare reform led to cash assistance caseloads being signiﬁ-
cantly more cyclically responsive.
Our results are highly robust to several alternative specifications not
reported here. We find similar results if we use lagged unemployment
rates and if we allow a more flexible state trend (quadratic rather than
the linear trends in the main specification). Further, we find no evidence
of nonlinear impacts of unemployment rates—we had conjectured that
an increase in unemployment from a higher base might lead to larger
effects. The results are very similar if we use only data from the 1989-
2010 period. Finally, both the food stamps and cash welfare results are
robust to adding controls for the state maximum real AFDC/TANF ben-
efits for a family of three. (Benefit levels are an important state cash
MARIANNE P. BITLER and HILARY W. HOYNES 107
12367-02a_Bitler_rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:15 AM  Page 107welfare policy variable that changes throughout the pre– and post–welfare
reform period.)
36
We conclude from these results that the unemployment rate has a posi-
tive, significant, and robust effect on cash welfare and food stamp case-
loads. Further, welfare reform is generally associated with reductions in
the cyclicality of cash welfare participation and increases in the cyclicality
of food stamp participation, although not all interactions reach statistical
signiﬁcance.
37
III.B. Outcomes for Households and for Single Female Family Heads
Using the March CPS
We next analyze data from the pooled 1980–2010 March CPS sur-
veys. Our primary focus is on outcomes for single female–headed families
with children (table 5) and on households containing at least one child
under 18 (tables 6 and 7). We estimate equation 1 and include controls
for the race or ethnicity, sex (where appropriate), age, and education of the
woman or the household head. We also examine impacts on various sub-
samples, including single female family heads with 12 or fewer years of
education, households whose head has 12 years of education or fewer, and
households with at least one family unit with a single female head and a
child. These alternative subsamples are intended to select groups that are
relatively more disadvantaged and more likely than the general popula-
tion to have been at risk of participating in the safety net in general, and
cash welfare in particular.
We start by examining impacts on earnings, income, and cash welfare
income for a sample of single mothers with children. This is a useful start-
ing place because many prior studies have shown that welfare reform has
led to increases in employment for this group (see Blank 2002 for a
review). These results (reported in table 5) show robust and statistically
signiﬁcant evidence that cash welfare income is countercyclical and that
earnings and income are procyclical. A 1-percentage-point increase in the
108 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
36. We thank Rebecca Blank for suggesting that we control for this variable, especially
since our time period 1980–2009 contains a long period before welfare reform. Our results
are also unchanged if we incorporate the solely state funded program caseload (data
obtained from LaDonna Pavetti and starting in 2006) into our measure of state cash welfare
caseloads.
37. We also examined similar models for unemployment compensation and found
stronger countercyclical responses than of cash welfare or food stamps to the unemployment
rate (not surprisingly) but no evidence that the use of unemployment compensation over the
business cycle has been affected by welfare reform.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12367-02a_Bitler_rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:15 AM  Page 109unemployment rate leads to a $78 (in 2009 dollars, or about 6 percent)
increase in yearly public assistance income in the any-reform speciﬁcation.
The same increase in unemployment leads to about a 1 percent decline
in wage and salary income and a 1 percent decline in total (nuclear)
family income in the any-reform specification. Further, the interactions
between welfare reform and unemployment are largely negative, 8 of the
12 interactions are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level or better,
and 7 are signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level or better. A negative coefﬁcient
implies that welfare reform led to a decrease in the cyclicality for cash
welfare income (since the main effect on unemployment is positive, show-
ing that cash welfare receipt is countercyclical) and an increase in the
cyclicality for earnings and total income (since the main effect is negative,
showing that earnings and total income are procyclical). This is important
because if earnings are more procyclical after reform—falling more in the
recent recession than they would have before reform—then greater counter-
cyclicality in the safety net is necessary to maintain the same level of
well-being. This combination (less insurance through cash welfare and
more vulnerability in recessions) suggests a bad combination of effects.
To get a sense of the magnitudes of the interaction coefficients for the
any-reform specifications, a 1-percentage-point increase in the unem-
ployment rate after reform would lead to an additional decrease in pub-
lic assistance income of $4, or about 0.3 percent (with a 95 percent
confidence interval of −4.9 to 4.3 percent), an additional decrease in
wage and salary income of $356, or about 2.0 percent (95 percent confi-
dence interval of −4.2 to 0.3 percent), and a decrease in total family
income of $423, or about 1.6 percent (95 percent confidence interval of 
−3.3 to 0.1 percent). These findings suggest that increases in unemploy-
ment such as that during the recent recession could lead to economically
meaningful decreases in earnings and income in the wake of reform. In
results not shown, coefficients on the unemployment rate and its inter-
action with reform are larger in magnitude (more negative) for wage and
salary income and for total income for the sample of low-education single
female family heads.
Table 6 presents results for our central measure of family well-being,
the poverty rate, for all households with children. We present results
using both the official poverty measure and our alternative measure, and
we measure poverty at the household level. We construct our alternative
poverty measure using the existing ofﬁcial thresholds and an expanded
measure of household income, which adds to money income the cash value
of food stamps, school lunches, and housing subsidies and subtracts pay-
110 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12367-02a_Bitler_rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:15 AM  Page 111roll taxes and net federal and state taxes (including the EITC).38 To explore
outcomes across the distribution, we look at the fractions of households
below 50 percent of the poverty threshold (extreme poverty) and below
100 and 150 percent of the poverty threshold, using total household cash
income and our alternative measure of resources including some trans-
fers and taxes. Here we present results for our pre-versus-post measure of
welfare reform, where reform is deﬁned as any reform. For each speciﬁca-
tion we report the coefﬁcients on the main effect for the unemployment
rate and its interaction with the welfare reform variable.
Table 6 shows that higher unemployment rates lead to statistically sig-
nificant increases in official and alternative poverty as well as in the
fractions of families below 50 percent and 150 percent of the poverty
threshold, using either measure. The any-reform results consistently show
that the countercyclicality of poverty increased after welfare reform
(positive interaction added to the positive main effect). This is true for our
preferred, alternative poverty measure, it holds across all levels of poverty,
and the effect sizes are fairly similar across the different poverty measures
(all between 1 and 2.5 percent of the mean of the dependent variable).
Interestingly, the results reach statistical signiﬁcance only for 150 percent
of ofﬁcial poverty. (Results using time limits or sanction severity are less
consistent.) For the low-education household head sample, the ﬁndings
(not shown in the table), are similar, the magnitudes are about the same as
a share of the mean, and the positive interaction coefﬁcient is statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level for 150 percent of ofﬁcial poverty, and at
the 10 percent level for 150 percent of alternative poverty.
Table 7 presents our ﬁnal set of results for CPS outcomes. The top panel
shows results for any household participation in AFDC/TANF, food
stamps, SSI, and the broader safety net (non-Medicaid, non-AFDC/TANF
safety net beneﬁts). The bottom panel shows the household measures for
“anyone uninsured last year,” for demographic stress (more than one fam-
ily in the household, at least one of which has a child), for the presence of
any female family head in the household, and for the presence of a woman
in the household who is “disconnected” by Blank and Brian Kovak’s (2008)
112 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
38. We constructed this alternative measure ourselves, making every effort to maintain
consistency over time while including as many components of CPS experimental poverty
measures as possible (see, for example, Dalaker 2005). This measure is available only for a
subset of survey years: 1980–87, 1989–90, and 1992–2008 (2009 calendar-year data had
not been released at the time of this writing).
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Table 7. Regressions Estimating Impact of the Business Cycle and Welfare Reform on
Safety Net Participation and Household Well-Beinga





public food TANF safety
Independent variable assistance stamps Any SSI net beneﬁt
State unemployment  0.004*** 0.010*** −0.001 0.008***
rate (0.001) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.002)
Unemployment rate × 0.005 0.008** 0.0004 0.008**
any reform (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Mean of dependent  0.122 0.199 0.044 0.387
variable
No. of observations 378,067 378,067 378,067 361,340
Adjusted R
2 0.17 0.17 0.04 0.21
Dependent variable: probability that household 
had indicated characteristicb
Anyone Any Any family
lacks Household family head is a
health contains head is disconnected
insurance >1 family female womanc
State unemployment  0.006** 0.002** −0.0004 0.0003
rate (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005)
Unemployment rate × 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001
any reform (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Mean of dependent 0.357 0.092 0.293 0.041
variable
No. of observations 346,817 381,817 381,817 381,817
Adjusted R
2 0.09 0.13 0.46 0.05
Source: Authors’ regressions
a. Regressions are performed on data from the 1980–2010 March CPS. Program participation and lack
of insurance refer to the preceding calendar year and thus cover 1980–2009; living arrangements refer to
the time of the survey. Observations are by household, and the sample includes all households with a child
under 18 headed by someone with a high school education or less. Models also include year ﬁxed effects,
state ﬁxed effects, state-speciﬁc linear time trends, main effects for welfare reform, and demographic con-
trols for race/ethnicity, age, sex, and education of the household head. For outcomes measured over the
last calendar year, the main reform variable is measured as the share of the past calendar year that reform
was in place, and the time limit policies are coded according to what was in place in December of that
year. For outcomes measured at the time of the survey, welfare reform is measured by whether the policy
was in place as of March of the survey year. Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the ***1 percent,
**5 percent, and *10 percent level.
b. Sample consists of households with children whose head has less than 12 years of education.
c. Deﬁned similarly to Blank and Kovak (2008) as a single female family head aged 18–58 living with
a child, with no income from public assistance or earnings.
12367-02a_Bitler_rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:15 AM  Page 113deﬁnition.39 To focus on a group with higher likelihood of being affected
by welfare, all of the outcomes in this table are estimated on the sample of
households with children where the head has 12 years of education or less.
To begin, we use our CPS sample to examine participation in cash wel-
fare and food stamps. We present these results for two reasons. First, given
concerns about underreporting in the CPS, it is informative to compare
these results with those from the administrative data. If they are similar, it
lessens our concern about the importance of underreporting in a pooled
cross-sectional analysis with demographic controls and state and year
ﬁxed effects.
40 The qualitative conclusions using the CPS sample match
those from the administrative results well: cash welfare and food stamps
are both countercyclical (with a positive main effect on unemployment),
and the magnitudes are in the same ballpark as those for the administrative
data. A 1-percentage-point increase in unemployment leads to about a
0.4-percentage-point increase in the probability that someone in the
household had cash assistance income last year (this is about a 3.3 per-
cent increase). The same increase in the unemployment rate leads to 
a 1.0-percentage-point increase in the probability that someone in the
household got food stamps last year (about a 5 percent increase). The co-
efﬁcients on the interaction of reform and the unemployment rate are also
positive in both regressions, and the pattern of significance is similar to
that in the administrative data (the p-value for the interaction for welfare is
0.105, and that for food stamps is 0.023).
41 The effect of a 1-percentage-
point increase in the unemployment rate on food stamp receipt is about a
114 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
39. More precisely, our deﬁnition approximates Blank and Kovak’s deﬁnition 1, in
which a disconnected woman is a single female family head aged 18–58 living with a child,
with no income from public assistance or earnings. We also explored two other deﬁnitions.
The ﬁrst deﬁnes a disconnected woman as a single female family head aged 18–58 living
with a child and earning less than $2,000 a month while receiving income from public assis-
tance of less than $1,000 a month (both ﬁgures in 2009 dollars); the second adds the restric-
tion that real monthly income from SSI is less than $1,000. Results were similar across
measures.
40. For another approach to dealing with underreporting in a recent analysis of trends in
poverty, see Scholz, Mofﬁtt, and Cowan (2009).
41. They should not be identical for the following reasons. First, the administrative data
are monthly and deﬁne the main reform variable as a dummy for implementation by a par-
ticular month, whereas the CPS data are annual and the reform variable is the share of the
calendar year that reform was in place. Second, the sample in the administrative regressions
is everyone (with the dependent variable having the total caseload in the numerator and total
population in the denominator), whereas the CPS sample is households with children and a
low-educated head (with the dependent variable being the presence or absence of someone
in the household receiving the beneﬁt). Third, the CPS welfare variable includes other forms
of public assistance such as general assistance.
12367-02a_Bitler_rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:15 AM  Page 1144 percent increase after reform. Our conclusion from these speciﬁcations is
unchanged from that from the administrative caseloads: both programs are
cyclically responsive, but only the food stamp program has become signif-
icantly more so after reform.
In separate analyses we ﬁnd that SSI bears little relationship to the busi-
ness cycle and that this does not change with welfare reform. The ﬁnal col-
umn in the top panel of table 7 reports results for our comprehensive
measure of safety net beneﬁts that includes many public assistance pro-
grams (but excludes AFDC/TANF, general assistance, and Medicaid). The
results here are very clear: overall safety net participation is strongly coun-
tercyclical (the main effect is positive and signiﬁcant, and a 1-percentage-
point increase in unemployment leads to about a 2.1 percent increase in
receipt), and the cyclicality signiﬁcantly increases after welfare reform
(the interaction is positive and signiﬁcant, and again a 1-percentage-point
increase in unemployment after reform leads to an additional 2.1 percent
increase in receipt). The picture that emerges is that although the effect of
cash welfare protection (follow-ing increases in unemployment) has fallen
or stayed the same after reform, protection through other safety net pro-
grams is increasing.
The bottom panel of table 7 presents other household outcomes. The
propensity to be uninsured and the rate of doubling up increase with unem-
ployment, yet the propensity for the household to contain a female head or
a disconnected woman does not vary significantly over the cycle. Inter-
estingly, all of the interactions are positive, implying that welfare reform is
associated with an increase in the cyclicality of these adverse outcomes.
However, these results are only suggestive, as none reaches statistical
signiﬁcance. We also considered a host of other outcomes, none of which
showed signiﬁcant changes in their cyclicality after reform, including the
presence of disability income in the household, the presence of any related
subfamily with a child, the presence of more than one family with a child,
health, and the other measures of disconnected women (results available
from the authors on request).
III.C. Other Outcomes
The CPS income and poverty measures that we described above are
important for capturing the economic well-being of families affected by
welfare reform, whereas some of the other outcomes matter for capturing
other dimensions such as health insurance coverage or doubling up. A lim-
itation of the income and poverty results is that it is well known that wel-
fare and other government transfers are underreported in the CPS and other
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our use of both administrative data and an alternative measure of poverty
in the micro data. Furthermore, households may save or borrow and may
receive private transfers that are not well measured in household survey data.
One common alternative measure of well-being considered in the devel-
opment literature is consumption, which may be easier to measure than
income and poverty in some contexts. Meyer and Sullivan (2008) have
used expenditure and time use as alternative measures of well-being and
have shown that among single woman-headed families, those low in the
income distribution and low in the expenditure distribution experienced
different changes from the 1990s to the 2000s. The public use version of
the Consumer Expenditure Survey does not contain state identiﬁers and is
available only through the ﬁrst quarter of 2009, and so we leave these data
to be analyzed in future work.
We estimated models for food expenditure using data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (available only through 2005). We estimated
equation 1 on a sample of female heads of household aged 25–61 living
with children, for the period 1980–2005. These results, not shown here,
show that increases in the unemployment rate lead to reductions in food
consumption, with no evidence that the cyclicality changed with reform
(although these estimates had large standard errors relative to the esti-
mated coefﬁcients). We also estimated models for food insecurity, data for
which come from the December CPS supplements.
42 The drawback of the
food insecurity measures is that because they are consistently available
only from 2001 on (our sample goes through 2008), nearly all the variation
with which reform’s effects on cyclicality are identiﬁed is cross-sectional,
and thus we do not focus on them.
IV. Discussion
Prior work indicates that participation in cash welfare has decreased with
the transition from AFDC to TANF (Council of Economic Advisers 1997,
Ziliak and others 2000, and more recently Danielson and Klerman 2008).
Why this is so is not fully understood, but possibilities include an interest
in “banking” benefits for the future (see, for example, Grogger and
Michalopoulos 2003), the burden of complying with work requirements,
individuals being removed from the rolls because they reached the time
limits, changes in what the state spends TANF money on, and so on. This
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would be less strong after welfare reform.
Our view of the results is that cash welfare has indeed become less
cyclical after reform, or at least has not become more cyclical, although
we caution that our estimated coefficients do not uniformly support this
view and that few reach statistical significance. By contrast, our findings
for food stamps and a broader measure of “any safety net participation
except for AFDC/TANF and Medicaid” suggest an increased sensitivity
to the business cycle after reform; for both of these, participation is coun-
tercyclical (rising when unemployment rates rise) and becomes more so
after reform.
The descriptive evidence about the role that eligibility and take-up play
in informing these ﬁndings is informative. Our own descriptive work and
that of others (for example, Zedlewski 2008) suggest that use of cash assis-
tance did not increase in either the mild recession of 2001 or the most
recent recession (with the caveat that unemployment may not have peaked
yet). The available evidence suggests that the decline in caseloads after
welfare reform (and the lack of increase in the post–welfare reform reces-
sions) is explained almost completely by declines in take-up rather than
declines in eligibility (for example, because recipients reached their time
limits). The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2008) esti-
mates that eligibility for cash welfare has fluctuated within a relatively
narrow range, from 5.7 million families in 1995 to 5.1 million in 1999,
4.6 million in 2001, 4.8 million in 2003, and 5.3 million in 2005 (the most
recent year available; all years in this paragraph are ﬁscal years).
43 By con-
trast, take-up rates have fallen steeply, from 84 percent in 1995 to 48 per-
cent in 2001, 46 percent in 2003, and 40 percent in 2005. At the same time,
the number of households eligible for food stamps went up from 15 million
in 1995 to 15.2 million in 2001, 17.9 million in 2003, and 18.1 million in
2005, while take-up declined from 69 percent in 1995 to a low of 48 per-
cent in 2001 before rising to 59 percent in 2005. This suggests that the
cyclical response in caseloads after welfare reform is driven primarily by
changes in take-up.
It would be of interest to know about the effects of the Great Recession
on the outcomes of groups who are no longer participating in welfare 
as well as those that are. Unfortunately, not only is it hard to statistically
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are no longer doing so, but many of the outcomes of interest are not well
measured or are measured only in small samples. Thus, we again turn to
descriptive evidence.
To the extent that women were able to leave welfare through employ-
ment, have they been able to stay employed through recessions? Robert
Lerman (2005) ﬁnds that single mothers lost some ground during the 2001
recession but still were more likely to be employed or in the labor force
than before welfare reform. Are workers who might end up unemployed
able to access other parts of the safety net such as unemployment compen-
sation? Christopher O’Leary (2010) presents ﬁndings from administrative
data about experiences of welfare recipients from four states who left wel-
fare for work: 79 percent experienced a new spell of unemployment within
3 years, yet only 24 percent of these applied for unemployment insurance
(far below application rates in the general population), and only 50 percent
of the applicants eventually received unemployment insurance benefits
(also low relative to the general population). In our pooled March CPS
data, about 11 percent of households with children who had some public
assistance income from 1979 to 2009 also had income from workers’ com-
pensation, unemployment compensation, or veterans’ payments. This frac-
tion ranged from 7.3 percent of households in 2007 to 16 percent in 2009.
What about the most disadvantaged? Concern has been growing about
the part of the pre-reform welfare caseload that was least ready to work.
Several recent studies have addressed the experience of so-called discon-
nected women, single female heads of families with children who neither
are participating in cash welfare (TANF and sometimes SSI as well) nor
have substantial earnings. Some share of this group is undoubtedly made
up of welfare leavers, and some of the leaver studies can inform us about
this group. Blank and Kovak (2008) find that among single female-
headed families with children with incomes under 200 percent of the
poverty line, 20 percent are disconnected. How these families are surviving
is a puzzle. More data and research are needed in order to know how to
address this issue.
V. Conclusion
The passage of the 1996 welfare reform act led to sweeping changes to the
central cash safety net program for families with children, replacing the
AFDC program with TANF. The key provisions of that law included work
requirements, ﬁnancial sanctions for noncompliance, and a lifetime time
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particularly noteworthy because it overturned more than 60 years of enti-
tlement to cash welfare for low-income families with children. Despite
dire predictions of rising poverty and deprivation, previous research has
shown that with reform, caseloads declined and employment increased,
with no detectible increase in poverty or reduction in child well-being.
Several important factors likely contribute to explaining “why the
experts were wrong.” It turns out that as welfare reform hit, earnings
subsidies for low-income families with children were rising through
expansions in the EITC. Further, the labor market of the ﬁrst 5 years after
welfare reform offered the most favorable conditions for low-skilled work-
ers in many decades. Finally, it seems that the new and stringently applied
pro-work policies led to larger behavioral responses than had been
expected based on models of the pre–welfare reform period.
This paper has reevaluated welfare reform in light of the severe
recession that began in December 2007. In particular, we have exam-
ined how reform has altered the cyclicality of the response of program
caseloads and family well-being. We find that TANF provides less pro-
tection, or at least no more protection, in an economic downturn than
the AFDC program that preceded it, but that the noncash welfare safety
net (and especially food stamps) is providing significantly more protec-
tion. In our analyses using both the official measure and our own alter-
native measure of poverty, the point estimates imply that the increase in
poverty in an economic downturn is greater after welfare reform than it
would have been before reform. These results are only suggestive, given
that few are statistically significant, but the findings are statistically sig-
nificant and robust for the propensity to live in a household with income
under 150 percent of the official poverty line. We find no significant
effect of reform on the cyclical responsiveness of food consumption,
food insecurity, or health, or on a number of other measures including
doubling up, lack of health insurance, and presence of a single female
family head.
Overall, we find no evidence that the prevalence of negative family
or household well-being in an economic downturn has improved after
welfare reform, and some weak evidence that it has worsened. Further, it
appears that food stamp beneﬁts are playing an important role in mitigat-
ing adverse impacts on income in post–welfare reform recessions. This
suggests a policy recommendation for continued current funding of the
food stamp program, should these results hold up with more data and for a
broader range of outcomes.
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a portion of children to be living in families that are “disconnected,” with
limited income and limited use of public support. Ideally, we would zero in
on this particularly fragile group. However, doing this would require better
data on family consumption, child and family well-being, and other child
outcomes as well as on family histories of welfare and other public assis-
tance and employment and income for large samples of families with
children by state and year, and these data are not available.
APPENDIX
Data and Sources
Contractions and Expansions: For table 1 we identified changes over
contractions as the range of years from an unemployment low (in terms
of the annual unemployment rate) to an unemployment high, and expan-
sions as the range from an unemployment high to an unemployment low.
Necessarily, then, the periods of expansion and contraction overlap by
one year. Each contraction corresponds to a recession (in one case to
two recessions) as identified by the Business Cycle Dating Committee
of the National Bureau of Economic Research. We pooled the two early-
1980s recessions, and the data end in 2009. The contraction periods are
1979–82 (corresponding to the NBER recessions of January to July 1980
and July 1981 to November 1982), 1989–92 (NBER recession of July
1990 to March 1991), 2000–03 (NBER recession of March to November
2001), and 2007–09 (NBER recession of December 2007 to June 2009).
The expansion periods are thus 1982–89, 1992–2000, and 2003–07. The
end date of 2009 for the most recent contraction may end up not being
the peak annual unemployment period, but 2009 is the last year for which
the bulk of our data are available. In ﬁgures 2, 5, 7, and 8 we have shaded
periods of contraction; for these we drop the first one-year period (the
unemployment rate low) and thus those periods are 1980–82, 1990–92,
2001–03, and 2008–09.
AFDC/TANF Administrative Data on Caseloads and Expenditure:
AFDC caseloads were downloaded from the web site of the Ofﬁce of Fam-
ily Assistance, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) at
www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-reports/caseload/caseload_archive.
html, and TANF caseloads (which, beginning in 2000, include Separate
State Program/Maintenance of Effort cases) from www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/ofa/data-reports/index.htm. Both measure average monthly case-
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combined AFDC/TANF expenditure) for 1980–2000 were provided by
Don Oellerich in the Ofﬁce of the Assistant Secretary for Planning Evalu-
ation at DHHS. TANF expenditure data are from the DHHS website at
www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofs/data/index.html. TANF cash expenditure
is deﬁned as the ﬁgure in the second data column (line 5a, “Basic Assis-
tance”) of table F-3, “Combined Spending of Federal and States Funds
with ARRA Funds Expended . . . in FY 2009.” TANF total expenditure
includes all expenditure (maintenance of effort from the state and federal
sources, including separate state programs, combined federal and state
expenditures on assistance, nonassistance, and both together, as reported
in table F, “Combined Spending of Federal and State Funds Expended
in FY [year].” Federal stimulus expenditure under the American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) is included in the 2009 data.
AFDC cash assistance numbers for 1979 came from the Green Book of
the U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means (waysandmeans.house.
gov/singlepages.aspx?NewsID=10490). The average monthly TANF beneﬁt
(used in table 3) is the average family benefit for 2006, expressed in
2009 dollars, from DHHS (2008), appendix A, table TANF-6. All AFDC
and TANF data are for the month or the fiscal year (which ends on 
September 30).
Food  Stamp Administrative  Data on Caseloads and Expenditure:
Caseloads and expenditure by month for calendar years 1980–2009 and
for January through March 2010 come from unpublished U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) data generously provided by Katie Fitzpatrick and
John Kirlin of the Economic Research Service, USDA. Table 1 presents
average monthly caseload and total annual payments.
Unemployment Insurance Administrative  Data on Caseloads and
Expenditure: Data for calendar years 1980 (or in some cases a later start-
ing date) through 2009 are unpublished data provided by the Ofﬁce of the
Chief Economist at the U.S. Department of Labor. The average benefit
is the weekly average beneﬁt amount for 2009Q4 from the website of the
Employment and Training Administration at the U.S. Department of Labor,
at workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/content/data_stats/datasum09/
DataSum_2009_4.pdf.
Unemployment for the United States and by State: The number of
unemployed and the unemployment rate for the nation as a whole and for
each state, annually and by month, come from the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics’ Current Population Survey, accessed at www.bls.gov/cps/ and www.
bls.gov/lau/. The monthly numbers are seasonally adjusted.
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from the annual Economic Report of the President, accessed at www.
gpoaccess.gov/eop/2010/B34.xls. State population data are from the
National Cancer Institute’s SEER (Surveillance Epidemiology and End
Results, at seer.cancer.gov/popdata/download.html) for 1980–2007, and
from the U.S. Census Bureau for 2008 on.
Deﬂator: The CPI-U is from the Economic Report of the President,
accessed at www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/tables10.html.
Census  Poverty Rates: Official poverty, all persons, and official
poverty, children, come from the U.S. Census Bureau, “Income, Poverty,
and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2009,” report P60-238,
tables B-1 and B-2. NAS alternative poverty numbers come from the U.S.
Census Bureau web site, at www.census.gov/hhes/www/povmeas/web_
tab4_nas_measures_historical.xls, “Ofﬁcial and National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) Based Poverty Rates: 1999 to 2008.” We report the series
MSI-NGA-CE, in which imputed out-of-pocket medical expenses are sub-
tracted from income (MSI), no geographic adjustments are made (NGA),
and the thresholds are based on consumption data from the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CE).
EITC: Data on the annual number of recipients and the total tax cost
(including refundable and nonrefundable portions) of the EITC for 1980–
2008 are from the Tax Policy Center’s “Tax Facts: Historical EITC
Recipients” for ﬁscal 1976–2010, downloaded from www.taxpolicycenter.
org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=37.
SSI: Data on number of recipients (those who received any payment
during the year), total beneﬁt payments, and average monthly beneﬁt are
from Social Security Administration (2010) and refer to federal plus state
supplementation program.
Other sources for tables 1 and 3 include the following:
—Consumption: statistics for expenditure by “Quintiles of income
before taxes,” published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and available at
www.bls.gov/cex/csxstnd.htm.
—Food insecurity: based on Food Security Supplements to the December
Current Population Survey for 2001–2008, compiled by Craig Gundersen
and Feeding America and graciously shared with us by Gundersen.
—Health insurance and delayed/didn’t get care because of cost: data
published by the Centers for Disease Control in “Health Insurance Cover-
age Trends, 1959–2007” (www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr017.pdf) as
well as annual reports based on the National Health Interview Survey
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Interview Survey,” various years).
—Homeless: from the Ofﬁce of Community Planning and Develop-
ment, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, “Annual
Homeless Assessment Report to Congress,” for 2007 and 2009.
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COMMENT BY
CHRISTOPHER JENCKS Marianne Bitler and Hilary Hoynes have pro-
vided the most comprehensive treatment to date of how low-income families
with children fared during the ﬁrst 3 years since the recent recession began.
Their primary goal, however, is not to chronicle what happened to these
families but to investigate whether they would have fared better if the pre-
1996 welfare system had still been in place. Simply tracking what has hap-
pened to these families since 2007 is a challenging task, partly because there
are dozens of potentially relevant indicators and no agreement about their rel-
ative importance, and partly because the U.S. statistical system takes so long
to produce many of these indicators. Figuring out what would have happened
in the absence of welfare reform is even more challenging, because the details
of this counterfactual are so uncertain. I take up these two issues in turn.
WHAT HAPPENED BETWEEN 2007 AND 2010? According to the National
Bureau of Economic Research, the economy began to contract in Decem-
ber 2007 and began to grow again in July 2009. But for families that derive
most of their income from the labor market, what matters is not whether
the economy is contracting or expanding, but whether demand for workers
is growing fast enough to provide jobs for a growing population of adults
who want work. Bitler and Hoynes therefore use the unemployment rate
to estimate the impact of the business cycle on family income and other
measures of well-being.
If we judge by official statistics on employment and population
growth, the number of would-be workers has grown faster than the num-
ber of jobs since the summer of 2007, and the gap continued to widen
even after the ofﬁcial unemployment rate peaked in October 2009. The
ofﬁcial unemployment rate began to decline in the fall of 2009 because
128
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dropped from the ofﬁcial unemployment count. If the job market tightens,
most of these “discouraged” workers will start looking again. That means
they must be taken into account both when we assess how many families
have been affected by the downturn and when we estimate how many addi-
tional jobs would be needed to get the unemployment rate down to the
level that prevailed in the middle of 2007.
One imperfect way to address this problem is to assume that the over-
all fraction of adults who want a job is likely to be about the same when
unemployment returns to its prerecession level as it was before the reces-
sion began. If that is the case, the size of the labor force as a share of the
adult population should yield a better picture of how far the nation is from
full employment at any given point in a downturn than the ofﬁcial unem-
ployment rate does. In 2007 civilian employment averaged 146.0 million
and unemployment averaged 7.1 million, so the total civilian labor force
averaged 153.1 million people, or 66.0 percent of all U.S. residents over the
age of 16. In November 2010, just before this comment was written, season-
ally adjusted employment was 138.9 million, unemployment was 15.1 mil-
lion, and the civilian labor force was 64.5 percent of the population over 16.
If 66.0 percent of those over the age of 16 still wanted jobs of the kind that
were available in 2007, and only 138.9 million people had jobs, roughly
18.7 million people who would have taken a job in 2007 were unemployed
in November 2010. If we deﬁne the “unemployed” in this way, the “true”
unemployment rate in November 2010 was 11.8 percent. Making the same
calculation for October 2009, when the ofﬁcial unemployment rate peaked,
the “true” unemployment rate was then 11.5 percent. At some point job
growth will presumably begin to exceed growth in the number of would-be
workers, but no one knows when that will be.
Bitler and Hoynes focus primarily on how rising unemployment affected
low-income families with children. The official child poverty rate rose
2.7 percentage points between 2007 and 2009 (see their table 1 and U.S.
Bureau of the Census 2010, table B-2). However, the ofﬁcial poverty rate
suffers from several problems that make it an unreliable guide to trends in
material hardship (Jencks, Mayer, and Swingle 2004). One well-known
problem is that poverty rates are calculated using family rather than house-
hold income, and the Census Bureau defines a family as including only
household members related by blood, marriage, or adoption. Thus, if an
unmarried mother has a live-in boyfriend, the Census Bureau does not
count his income when it determines whether the mother and her children
are poor. This rule makes mothers cohabiting with working boyfriends look
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poorer than they are. In bad times, however, this rule hides the increase in
child poverty that occurs when live-in boyfriends lose their jobs.
Another well-known problem is that the ofﬁcial poverty rate ignores both
taxes (notably the earned income tax credit, or EITC) and noncash govern-
ment benefits such as Medicaid, food stamps, and housing subsidies, all
of which play a critical role in the well-being of low-income families.
This approach to measuring income inflates the child poverty rate even
more than ignoring live-in boyfriends, but it biases the estimated impact of
unemployment on poverty only when taxes or noncash beneﬁts change at
the same time as unemployment. Bitler and Hoynes show that spending on
per capita on Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) did not
substantially increase between 2007 and 2009 but that spending per capita
on food stamps rose by two-thirds (see their table 1). Ignoring this increase
presumably tends to offset the bias created by ignoring any decline in
income from live-in boyfriends who become unemployed. Because of
these and other problems, Bitler and Hoynes calculate an adjusted poverty
rate, but it is available only through 2008. They also try to check their
conclusions against more direct measures of material hardship. I focus
here on hardship in three domains: food, housing, and health care.
FOOD. Every December the Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey
includes a “food security” supplement designed by the U.S. Department
of Agriculture. This supplement asks families about their food expendi-
ture, their use of food pantries, and their ability to buy as much food as they
think they need. The median family with children reported weekly spending
per person of $33 in both 2007 and 2009 (Nord, Andrews, and Carlson 2008,
p. 24; Nord and others 2010, p. 25).1 Since food prices rose about 3 percent
over those 2 years, $33 bought about 3 percent less (or at least less desir-
able) food in 2009 than in 2007. Median expenditure per person was only
about $2 per week lower among families headed by a single mother and only
$1 per week lower among families with incomes below the poverty line, pre-
sumably because the reported median is quite close to an eligible family’s
food stamp budget.
1. This ﬁnding should be treated cautiously. Measured in current dollars, the median
for all families with children was $33.33 per person in both years. This presumably reﬂects
the fact that the median family had three members and reported spending $100 a week in both
years. But because many families round their estimates of grocery spending to easily remem-
bered numbers, far more families report spending $100 a week than, say, $97 or $103. As a
result, the median may remain the same for a long time even if the full distribution is shifting
to the left or right.
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had trouble getting enough to eat. In rich countries like the United States,
few families experience protracted periods of hunger or malnutrition, but
many families experience occasional crises when they cannot afford to
buy enough food, and some experience such crises fairly often. Accord-
ing to the food security survey, 7.8 percent of children lived in families
that reported having turned to food pantries for help at some point during
2009, compared with only 5.3 percent during 2007. The fraction of all
families reporting that there had been times when the food they bought
“didn’t last” and they “didn’t have money to get more” rose from 12 per-
cent to 16 percent between 2007 and 2009. Over the same period, the frac-
tion of families reporting that an adult in the family was hungry and “didn’t
eat because there wasn’t enough money for food” rose from 3.3 percent
to 4.6 percent, and the fraction reporting that they had not eaten for a whole
day rose from 1.3 percent to 1.7 percent (Nord and others 2010, p. 45).
HEALTH. People’s health can suffer for many reasons during an economic
downturn. In the United States many people lose their health insurance
soon after they lose their job. Some even lose their health insurance with-
out losing their job, because their employer stops offering coverage.
The fraction of Americans with employment-based insurance fell from
59.3 percent in 2007 to 55.8 percent in 2009 (U.S. Census Bureau 2010,
table C-3). Public programs picked up some of those who lost their private
coverage, but the fraction without any heath insurance rose from 15.3 per-
cent to 16.7 percent. Among children, however, Medicaid expansion cut
the proportion who were uninsured from 11.0 percent in 2007 to 10.0 per-
cent in 2009.
A large body of research has shown that even in countries with universal
health insurance, workers’ health tends to deteriorate if they lose their job.
This is also true in the United States. However, Christopher Ruhm (2003)
has shown that when one looks at the entire population rather than just the
unemployed, mortality rates actually fall faster when the economy is con-
tracting than when it is growing. This is true not only in the United States
but in other high-income countries as well (Gerdtham and Ruhm 2005). At
least in the United States, the pattern seems to be linked to the fact that
heavy drinking, smoking, auto accidents, air pollution, and overtime work
also decline during downturns (Ruhm 2005).
It is too soon to be sure whether this benign effect of economic austerity
recurred between 2007 and 2009. Thus far the evidence is mixed. On the
one hand, provisional data from the National Center for Health Statistics
(NCHS, various years) indicate that infant mortality declined only mod-
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estly, from 6.7 to 6.6 deaths per 1,000 live births, between 2003 and 2007,
a time when unemployment was falling, but that it declined three times as
fast, from 6.6 to 6.3 per 1,000, between 2007 and 2009. That is consistent
with Ruhm’s earlier ﬁndings. Age-adjusted estimates for the rest of the
population are not yet available.
2
HOUSING. When unemployment rises, some families cannot pay their
mortgage or their rent and instead double up with relatives or friends. One
would expect doubling up to have been especially common in 2007–09,
since the collapse of the housing bubble led to more foreclosures and evic-
tions during these years than at any time since the 1930s. The U.S. Census
Bureau (2010) reported an 11.6-percentage-point rise between March 2008
and March 2010 in the number of households that included more than one
family. Apparently, however, very few of these families included children,
since Bitler and Hoynes report in their table 1 that the fraction of children
living in a household that included more than one family rose only 0.2 per-
centage points. It is hard to know what this measure means, since they report
a smaller annual increase between 2007 and 2009 than between 2003 and
2007, when unemployment was falling. Average household size, which rose
1.1 percent between March 2007 and March 2010 (from 2.558 persons
to 2.585 persons) may be a better measure of doubling up.
3 Indeed, the
increase in household size may underestimate the amount of doubling up,
because the number of births was 4.1 percent lower in 2009 than in 2007.
In due course, moreover, many families tire of sharing their home with
another family, especially if it includes children. Not surprisingly, the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (2010) estimates that the
number of families with children in shelters for the homeless also rose,
from 131,000 in January 2007 to 170,000 in 2009.
Taking all this evidence together, it seems clear that both the fraction of
families that sometimes had trouble getting enough to eat and the fraction
with serious housing problems rose between 2007 and 2009, which is con-
sistent with what one would expect based on both the rise in unemployment
and the rise in the ofﬁcial poverty rate. Mortality rates appear to have fallen
appreciably for infants, but there is no reliable evidence yet for adults.
2. Provisional data on mortality from all causes that are not adjusted for the aging of the
population indicate that the mortality rate fell more slowly between 2007 and 2009 than
between 2003 and 2007. However, age-adjusted mortality is falling faster than unadjusted
mortality, so conclusions based on the provisional data are very risky.
3. Household size is estimated using the ratio of persons to households in U.S. Census
Bureau (2010), tables B-1 and A-1. The estimates shown there are for March 2009, when the
survey was conducted.
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Bitler and Hoynes’s main goal is to ﬁgure out whether families with chil-
dren would have fared better during the current downturn if the pre-1996
welfare system had still been in place. They use standard econometric
methods to address this question, comparing trends within states before
and after each state implemented welfare reform. Their results suggest that
the effect of unemployment on child poverty was somewhat greater after
welfare reform, but their estimates have large standard errors, and in ﬁve
out of six cases the conﬁdence interval includes zero (see their table 6).
Nonetheless, since the primary goal of welfare reform was to make single
mothers more dependent on earnings and less dependent on “handouts,”
and since the clearest consequence of the new law was to reduce the num-
ber of families getting a monthly welfare check, from 4.5 million in ﬁscal
1996 to 2.1 million in ﬁscal 2002, Bitler and Hoynes’s expectation that
child poverty should have become more sensitive to labor market condi-
tions seems plausible, and nothing in their ﬁndings suggests that it is
wrong. That said, three comments are in order.
First, from a policy perspective it is not clear why we should even be
investigating the impact of welfare reform. Even if Bitler and Hoynes and
other researchers were finding that welfare reform had terrible conse-
quences for millions of children, the chances that legislators would respond
by bringing back anything like the old AFDC (Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children) regime are close to zero. Legislators might try to help single
mothers in other ways, such as by providing jobs and child care for all single
mothers or guaranteeing all low-income single mothers a housing subsidy,
but bringing back AFDC would be a nonstarter.
Second, it is not clear what “welfare reform” really includes in Bitler
and Hoynes’s analysis. They treat the states that introduced more stringent
requirements than those traditionally allowed by AFDC as having begun
welfare reform when their federal waiver was approved. However, the new
federal rules established in 1996 under the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which replaced AFDC
with TANF, were far more stringent than the rules introduced by states
under pre-1996 waivers. Welfare waivers were also contemporaneous with
increases in the EITC between 1993 and 1996 that made work a more
attractive alternative to welfare.
Furthermore, states did not implement the new TANF rules immediately.
States made it progressively harder for new applicants to get on the rolls, and
they enforced their time limits more assiduously over time. These efforts
to keep cutting the rolls year after year were motivated partly by state leg-
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islators’ desire to show their commitment to “work, not welfare,” and partly
by the threat of federal sanctions if states did not reduce the rolls more
every year. As a result, the number of families getting TANF benefits fell
by about half a million a year between fiscal 1996 and fiscal 2000 (from
4.5 million to 2.3 million). Some of this steady decline was surely due to
the tightening labor market, but unemployment fell only from 5.4 percent
to 4.0 percent between 1996 and 2000, and the labor force participation
rate rose only from 66.8 percent to 67.1 percent. The welfare rolls fell by
another 200,000 between 2000 and 2002, even though unemployment was
higher in 2002 than it had been in 1996 (5.8 percent versus 5.4 percent).
This history suggests that the effects of the EITC and PRWORA unfolded
gradually rather than instantaneously. When welfare reform is gradual and
the lags are uncertain, disentangling the effects of reform from the effects
of the EITC and unemployment is extremely difﬁcult, and it is no surprise
that most of Bitler and Hoynes’s coefﬁcients have large standard errors. My
table 1 provides a simple illustration of the underlying problem by showing
how child poverty changed between 1996 and 2009 as the unemployment
rate rose and fell. To minimize the problem of lags, I focus on peak-to-
trough and trough-to-peak changes in unemployment.
From 1996 to 2000 unemployment fell only 1.4 percentage points while
child poverty fell 4.3 percentage points, suggesting a very strong postreform
effect of full employment on child poverty. But after 2000 the relationship
between unemployment and child poverty weakened. Unemployment rose
2.0 percentage points between 2000 and 2003, but child poverty only rose
1.4 percentage points. Between 2003 and 2007 unemployment fell as much
as it had between 1996 and 2000 (1.4 percentage points), but child poverty
rose from 17.6 percent to 18.0 percent. By 2007, therefore, the link between
child poverty and the labor market was looking quite tenuous. However,
Table 1. Changes in Unemployment and in Child Poverty during Upturns and
Downturns, 1996–2009
1996 2000 2003 2007 2009
Unemployment (percent) 5.4 4.0 6.0 4.6 9.3
Child poverty (percent) 20.5 16.2 17.6 18.0 20.7
1996–2000 2000–03 2003–07 2007–09
Change in unemployment −1.4 +2.0 −1.4 +4.7
Change in child poverty −4.3 +1.4 +0.4 +2.7
As ratio to change in 
unemployment 3.07 0.70 −0.29 0.57
Sources: Economic Report of the President 2010, table B-35; U.S. Bureau of the Census (2010), p. 56.
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a more cautious conclusion. The official unemployment rate rose from
4.6 percent in 2007 to 9.3 percent in 2009, and each 1-percentage-point
rise in unemployment was associated with an increase in child poverty of
0.57 percentage point, which is fairly similar to the association during
the rise in unemployment between 2000 and 2003.
The fact that the relationship between unemployment and child poverty
varies so much could have numerous causes. First, the big drop in child
poverty between 1996 and 2000 reflected the fact that PRWORA and
the EITC induced more single mothers to look for work, and tight labor
markets helped them ﬁnd it. Second, wages near the bottom of the distribu-
tion rose. At the 20th percentile of the combined distribution for men and
women, for example, real wages rose 11 percent between 1996 and 2000,
which was the only period of sustained increase between 1973 and 2007
(Economic Policy Institute 2009, table 3.5). These factors could also explain
why child poverty was lower during 2001–03, a period of relatively high
unemployment, than it had been in the early 1990s. The fact that child
poverty hardly dropped at all after 2003, when unemployment began to
fall, is harder to explain.
Bitler and Hoynes try to deal with these problems by looking at trends
across the 50 states rather than within the United States as a whole. Their esti-
mates therefore rely on the average relationship between trends in unemploy-
ment and child poverty within states. Nonetheless, their estimates have large
standard errors and are seldom statistically signiﬁcant. My tentative conclu-
sion is thus that we are still some distance from identifying all the factors that
affect either ofﬁcial child poverty rates or the authors’ adjusted rates. The
same conclusion probably holds for the direct measures of children’s well-
being that both they and I discuss.
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COMMENT BY
BRUCE D. MEYER This paper by Marianne Bitler and Hilary Hoynes
examines the important question of how the social safety net has changed
over time and how these changes have affected the well-being of families.
Many indicators suggest that the safety net has changed substantially.
Whether in terms of program caseloads or in terms of expenditure, over
the past 15 years or so, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
and its successor Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) have
become much less important, while the earned income tax credit (EITC)
and the food stamp program (today known as the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program, or SNAP) have steadily expanded. More recently,
enrollment in and spending on unemployment insurance (UI) skyrocketed
in the Great Recession.
The paper begins with nice descriptions of the main programs that pro-
vide for the disadvantaged, focusing on AFDC/TANF, food stamps, and
UI. The program rules are carefully summarized, and recent changes to
these rules are described in detail. The focus on these programs partly
flows from the authors’ decision to examine the nonelderly exclusively.
The study also focuses on nonmedical assistance. If one is concerned about
where the current safety net might be failing to serve the disadvantaged,
cash or near-cash assistance to the nonelderly is likely to be the right place
to look. Robert Mofﬁtt and John Karl Scholz (2010) have noted that recent
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abled, and childless families through the Social Security (both its old-age
and its disability components), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and
health programs. In contrast, very poor families with children have seen a
decline in expenditure due to lower receipt rates of AFDC/TANF and food
stamps, although recently SNAP caseloads have risen considerably.
The paper also focuses on how the safety net for the nonelderly has
responded to the recession, rather than on how those disadvantaged by
persistently poor skills, disability, or old age have fared in recent years.
The paper’s analysis thus concentrates on those likely to be hurt given the
differing trends in government spending by demographic group, and given
that the economy is in the midst of its most severe downturn since the Great
Depression. The authors’ conclusions about the functioning of the safety net
will not be applicable to the elderly or to those among the nonelderly who
are suffering more long-term disadvantage.
It is also worth stepping back and thinking about the ways a recession can
hurt the disadvantaged. The most obvious way is through the loss of employ-
ment and a decline in earnings among the employed. Thus, the recession
is likely to have its largest effects on those who depend on employment,
namely, the able-bodied nonelderly. Another way to characterize the trends
in income support in recent years is as a shift in support from the non-
working poor to the working poor (Mofﬁtt 2003, 2007). Given this shift,
one might be especially worried if the recession leads to a loss of beneﬁts for
the working poor, such as from the EITC, as employment falls. Other effects
of the recession on the disadvantaged might include a reduced likelihood of
marriage and higher rates of marital dissolution (although Hellerstein and
Morrill 2010 provide evidence that divorce is procyclical), both of which
might impoverish single adults and their families. Finally, one might see a
decline in private transfers and other support for the poor.
A basic question that the paper could address more directly is how one
should go about assessing the state of the safety net. Presumably, econo-
mists and policymakers would like to know how the safety net cushions
any income shocks and prevents them from leading to a fall in family
well-being. To examine this question, we first need to assess the extent
of the shocks to income. We also need to decide how to measure family
well-being. We could measure well-being using income, which has a long
tradition. But income often only translates roughly into well-being, because
families save and borrow. Furthermore, most families, even most poor fam-
ilies, have substantial nonﬁnancial assets: homes, cars, and other durables.
Depending on their stock of these assets, a change in income will have dif-
COMMENTS and DISCUSSION 137
12367-02b_Bitler comment-rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:08 AM  Page 137ferent effects on their well-being. Finally, income is often misreported in
household surveys, especially among the most disadvantaged households.
Only half of food stamp and welfare dollars are reported in the main sur-
vey used by the authors, the Current Population Survey (Meyer, Mok,
and Sullivan 2009, Meyer and Goerge 2010). The reporting of private trans-
fers is likely worse. Consumption data are a good alternative to income
data, given that recent research shows that consumption is better mea-
sured than income at the bottom and that low consumption is more closely
associated with deprivation than is low income (Meyer and Sullivan 2003,
forthcoming-b). Other dimensions to well-being might also be of concern.
If families have less nonmarket time (including leisure), or if access to
medical care has changed, for example, then well-being is affected.
Factors other than the safety net might also have changed in the Great
Recession in ways that affect family well-being. The years leading up to
the recession as well as the recession years themselves were a period of
atypically slow employment growth. In addition, tighter credit and the
sharp decline in housing prices imply that many households can no longer
borrow or access housing equity in bad times, which suggests that the reces-
sion may have done more damage than its depth alone would indicate.
Thus, it seems likely that the effect of changes in the safety net may be dif-
ﬁcult to separate from that of other changes in economic conditions.
The paper reports three main sets of empirical results. The ﬁrst summa-
rizes aggregate changes in a number of measures of economic conditions,
beneﬁt receipt, and well-being both in the recent recession and in earlier
contractions and expansions. Among the most important ﬁndings from this
analysis are that even though unemployment rose more in the recent reces-
sion than in the 1979–82 recession, ofﬁcial poverty rose less, and total con-
sumption and food consumption in the bottom income quintile actually went
up. Also, food stamp receipt rose much more in this recession than in past
ones. These initial results do not indicate a newly permeable safety net.
The second set of results describes the responsiveness of state program
caseloads and individual reported receipt of beneﬁts to state unemployment
rates. The paper argues that food stamp caseloads and receipt have become
more sensitive to unemployment, but that the sensitivity of AFDC/TANF to
unemployment has not risen or may have fallen over time. However, the
evidence seems to be mixed. The authors’ variable interacting the unemploy-
ment rate with a dummy for the postreform period has a positive coefﬁcient in
both the AFDC/TANF and the food stamp regressions, suggesting increased
responsiveness of these programs, but it is statistically insigniﬁcant in both
cases. The authors also interact classiﬁcations of the different state welfare
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to do or one that can be done with conﬁdence, given the multidimensional
and qualitative changes in state welfare laws. In any case, only one of ﬁve
coefﬁcients in the AFDC/TANF caseload regressions is signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero at the 5 percent level or better, and the two that are signif-
icant in the food stamp caseload regressions are of conﬂicting sign. Thus,
the evidence of decreased responsiveness is weak.
In the analysis using survey data on beneﬁt receipt by program, the results
are similarly inconclusive. The responsiveness of AFDC/TANF receipt to
changes in unemployment more than doubles after reform, whereas that for
food stamps does not quite double but is more precisely measured and sig-
niﬁcantly different from zero. These survey results should be interpreted
with caution, however, given that the survey misses half of TANF and food
stamp receipt.
Another interesting feature of the paper is its use of both administrative
aggregate data and survey data. The authors suggest that similarities in the
results in the two data sources may mean that the deﬁciencies of the survey
data are not important. However, the differences in speciﬁcations, the large
standard errors, and the lack of comparison of the magnitudes of the coef-
ﬁcients make this exercise unconvincing. One can easily compare in the
survey and administrative data, however, the magnitude of the interaction
coefﬁcient on unemployment after reform relative to the main effect (the
unemployment rate alone) in tables 4 and 7. The administrative data indi-
cate that AFDC/TANF caseloads are about 20 percent more sensitive after
reform, whereas the survey data indicate an increased responsiveness of
125 percent. The discrepancy for food stamps is also very large. This is not
evidence that allows one to conclude that survey errors are unimportant.
In any case, it is not clear that one should conclude a great deal from
such regressions about the likely changes in caseloads or benefit receipt
in future recessions. Each recession is a little different. The responsive-
ness of poverty to unemployment has varied sharply across decades, as
many authors have found (for example, Blank and Card 1993, Blank 2000,
Haveman and Schwabish 2004, and Meyer and Sullivan forthcoming-a).
In addition, changes in state welfare programs over time have been very
large and are hard to summarize, and these might be confounding the rela-
tionship of caseloads and expenditure with unemployment.
AFDC/TANF receipt may be less sensitive now to unemployment than
it has been historically, but the evidence is not there yet to show it. It would
not be surprising if AFDC/TANF were not particularly sensitive to unem-
ployment, because it is a program that serves a population with low histor-
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low and has changed over time (Blank 2001). If this sensitivity is lower in
recent decades, it might reﬂect the fact that federal funding does not vary
with unemployment under the block grant system introduced as part of
welfare reform. Alternatively, it might be due to the program being more
targeted at those who cannot work and thus are less sensitive to labor mar-
ket conditions.
The paper’s third set of results examines the effects of welfare reform on
various well-being measures, principally poverty rates. The authors also
look at living arrangements and “disconnectedness” (the condition of being
effectively cut off from both work and welfare). For all outcomes, the authors
examine the coefﬁcient on the interaction of unemployment with welfare
reform, essentially asking whether well-being declines more with higher
unemployment after welfare reform than before. Before examining this
interaction, or second-order effect, it is worth knowing a bit more about what
happened overall after welfare reform. One might suspect that changes in
caseloads provide limited information on well-being, given that AFDC/
TANF caseloads fell from 5 million assistance units to under 2 million, yet
the evidence is mixed on how families fared after welfare reform. James X.
Sullivan and I looked extensively at this issue (Meyer and Sullivan 2004,
2008) and found that, overall, families’ material well-being is apparently
higher after welfare reform, but it is a complicated and mixed picture. Con-
sumption by single mothers rose in all income deciles, and their income
rose in all but the ﬁrst. We argue that the decline in reported income for the
bottom decile is likely due to misreporting. Housing characteristics (num-
ber of rooms, presence of air conditioning and appliances, and so forth)
improved after welfare reform for those who were likely to be on welfare,
but health insurance coverage fell for some groups of single mothers.
Time spent in nonmarket activity (leisure time and time spent on house-
work) dropped substantially for single mothers, but this loss of time does
not appear to have decreased their time with children (also see Gelber
and Mitchell 2009); rather, it has come out of time spent cleaning and
shopping and the like.
With the above as background, let me turn to the current results. The
paper regresses several poverty measures, family structure, and a dummy
variable for neither work nor welfare receipt on the unemployment rate
after welfare reform as well as the unemployment rate for the entire period.
These results are probably the most important ﬁndings of the paper. For
only one of the outcomes is the key interaction coefﬁcient signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero. That outcome is the share of people with income below
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and 50 percent of the poverty line), the coefﬁcients are insigniﬁcant. Given
that the ofﬁcial income deﬁnition used to determine the ofﬁcial poverty
measure misses many of the most important parts of the safety net (food
stamps, the EITC, the child tax credit, housing assistance), it is not an espe-
cially useful tool for evaluating the safety net. When the authors examine
poverty measures that use alternative income definitions that account for
taxes, food stamps, and other beneﬁts, the changes are insigniﬁcant, as they
are for other well-being outcomes. Even the alternative poverty numbers
are questionable given that, as noted above, the survey that the authors rely
on misses half of food stamps and TANF. I would urge the authors to look
at changes in means and low percentiles of consumption in the Consumer
Expenditure Survey.
The situation of families with children may be worse in high-
unemployment areas than it was in the past under similarly high unemploy-
ment, but the data to determine if this is so are not yet available. Chairman
Mao, when asked whether the French Revolution was a success, report-
edly said that it was too early to tell. This sentiment applies even more
strongly to the topic of this paper. In evaluating these analyses, we should
be aware that it may be too early to determine how the safety net is
affecting families in the Great Recession and its aftermath. The unem-
ployment rate was 5.8 percent, equal to the median value over the full
sample, in 2008, the next-to-last year of data examined in the principal
analyses in the paper. Unemployment rose sharply in 2009, but one year
of data with high unemployment is not a lot on which to base conclu-
sions. There is substantial variation across states, but still it is too early
to conclude how the new safety net will perform in recessions.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION Donald Kohn wondered about possible inter-
actions between welfare and unemployment insurance. Among the many
advantages of having low-income individuals in the labor force rather than
out of it is greater access to the UI system. Increased use of UI should
damp the cyclicality of welfare by delaying any cyclical effects. This is
particularly likely to occur with low-skilled people who have trouble re-
entering the labor force as extended benefits expire. One result is that
any cyclical effects would tend to be seen at or after the end of a recession.
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many others arguing that the ofﬁcial poverty measures are too ﬂawed to be
useful as objects of research. A good alternative is to look at post-tax, post-
transfer measures of income among the lower percentiles of the consump-
tion distribution. He further wondered why many experts in this ﬁeld had
been wrong ex ante about the impact of welfare reform. Understanding this
error would inform the theories and models used in evaluating the impact
of changes in this and other policy programs. Christopher Jencks thought
one reason the predictions had been so wrong was that AFDC payments
made up a much smaller fraction of what people were living on before wel-
fare reform than most researchers had assumed. Bruce Meyer added that
the employment rate of single mothers, whose ability to work and be hired
had been in question, rose more quickly than expected.
Helen Ladd asked whether it was correct that most of the increase in
employment was in short-term or temporary jobs that did not lead to
longer-term employment. Meyer noted that among high school dropout
single mothers, employment went up by roughly 60 percent after reform.
The increases for that group have persisted, but it remains a good question
whether they have received wage increases over time that are typical for
people with their skill level.
David Romer thought the critical question was whether the social safety
net had been shredded to the point where a sizeable recession would cause
an enormous amount of suffering. The tone of the paper and of the discus-
sion implied that it had not, but quite a few of the individual indicators
discussed in the paper suggested that the answer was not entirely clear.
The authors find that poverty is now more cyclical, as is the number of
disconnected women. And they find that both food insecurity and the
postponing or forgoing of medical care rose substantially more in the most
recent recession than previously.
Justin Wolfers noted that issues related to welfare, like the extension
of unemployment insurance, are very much on the current policy agenda,
making the discussion of direct contemporary policy relevance. He also
perceived a puzzle in the paper’s results. Since the beginning of the recent
recession, the poverty rate was up by 1.8 percentage points, whereas the
early-1980s recession had raised the poverty rate by 3.3 points. If welfare
reform was what was different between the two periods, why wasn’t the
rise in the poverty rate even greater in the current downturn? In addition,
almost everything that has been done to the social safety net over the past
20 years is not measured by the poverty rate. These two issues together
suggest that the real puzzle of this recession is why the aggregate poverty
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welfare reform, which appears to have raised the cyclicality of poverty.
James Hines suggested thinking also about the cyclicality of the earned
income tax credit, a policy that was motivated by many of the same ideas
that had inspired welfare reform. It would be interesting to know whether
the generosity of the EITC increases during recessions, effectively acting as
a counterbalance to welfare reform. He conjectured that it may not increase,
since virtually all of the EITC’s benefits are conditioned on working,
whereas unemployment rises in a recession. On the other hand, to the
extent a recession causes some previously fully employed workers to
become underemployed or to have to accept a lower wage, some of them
might become newly eligible for the EITC.
Henry Aaron saw the discussion as highlighting that the most under-
studied subject in income distribution research is disability insurance.
Over the period in question, the number of people on disability insurance
tripled, and total expenditure on that program was probably larger than for
any of the other programs under discussion. Disability insurance is not an
income-tested program and thus goes at least in part to people who would
not have been poor without the benefits. But a complete accounting of
the effects of the recession on low-income Americans nonetheless calls
for a discussion of what has happened with respect to disability insurance
enrollments and expenditure.
Melissa Kearney thought that welfare reform, by essentially making
it harder to enroll in and stay on a key form of government assistance,
was important to the debates surrounding other assistance programs: about
extending unemployment insurance, about making disability insurance
harder to qualify for, and even about allowing stimulus payments to go
to states’ provision of these programs. She was interested in the role of
the states, and in particular how much larger the welfare caseload increase
would have been if states were not actively discouraging caseloads. She
cited a paper by Jeffrey Kubik showing that in times of ﬁscal stress, states
push more people from AFDC onto SSI, which suggests that states might
be acting differently in the post-welfare reform era in terms of discourag-
ing applications. Kearney proposed thinking about applications to all of
these programs collectively as a better measure of the need for assistance.
Many people are applying for these programs but not getting them, and
long-term programs like disability insurance and SSI are more relevant to
ﬁscal consequences.
Kristin Forbes wondered if it was accurate to interpret the paper’s
results as saying that welfare reform had signiﬁcantly reduced the costs of
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large negative effects during normal times, but also no large general nega-
tive effects even during recessions. If this is true, are there lessons for
reforming other major entitlement programs? In particular, a look back at
what people were saying during the welfare reform debate of the 1990s
might enlighten some of the current discussions about entitlement reforms.
Gary Burtless underscored that both the employment and the earnings
of the population affected by welfare reform were much more resilient
than most forecasters had expected: real wages at the bottom end of the
earnings distribution improved after reform, for the ﬁrst time in probably
20 years. He also found it striking that, unlike a lot of reforms, this one had
been preceded by almost a decade of systematic randomized trials across
the country, in which many of the elements of the reform were tested in
local populations. None of these randomized trials had uncovered employ-
ment gains of the size witnessed after reform passed at the national level. It
was and remains a mystery how much of that increase was due to possible
social interaction effects (that is, individuals within a group influencing
each other’s behavior, for example by informing one another of new
program rules and how best to respond to them), and to what extent 
the limitations of doing randomized trials for this kind of policy caused
the effect of nationwide reform to be underestimated. It is hard to observe
social interaction effects in a small-scale randomized trial, because only a
small percentage of the affected population is enrolled in any one tested
program.
Burtless also argued that welfare reform should have made overall
unemployment rates slightly more cyclical, because a population that for-
merly had been largely insulated from the labor market, by being outside
of it, was forced to enter the workforce. In a recession, a lot of disadvan-
taged single women are on the margin of being employed or unemployed
rather than being solidly outside the workforce. However, this effect is
likely small, as this population does not make up a large proportion of the
working-age population.
Melissa Kearney picked up on Burtless’ point about the possible social
network effects of the 1996 reform. There have been some isolated policy
studies but nothing in the models for cultural change. These sorts of cultural
network effects are very well captured, however, in the agent-based models
that are part of the Brookings Social Genome Project.
Ricardo Reis noted that recessions are times when discretionary ﬁscal
spending is taking place, trying to channel more money toward a whole
series of programs, including those that assist the poor. Much of the ﬁscal
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almost every transfer program. Reis was curious to know more about how
welfare money had been spent over the last 2 years and to what channels it
was directed, because this might shed light on whether the outcomes are
what might have been expected 15 or 20 years ago.
Robert Hall was interested in the relationship between unemploy-
ment and the TANF caseload, which has been shown to rise substan-
tially in proportional terms but not nearly as much as unemployment
during recessions. To take unemployment as the benchmark would sug-
gest that each TANF unit depended largely on one person’s earnings with
the typical amount of unemployment. In reality, the matching of workers to
TANF units is more complicated, and any given TANF unit may have
zero, one, two, or more earners. Further, a model that makes the TANF case-
load rise in proportion to unemployment neglects the high earnings replace-
ment rate of UI for the population potentially eligible for TANF, and it
neglects the relationship between unemployment in that population and
the overall unemployment rate. Throughout the recession and its after-
math, real post-transfer income per capita has continued to rise. House-
holds have responded to the recession by spending substantially less of
their income and increasing their saving. The social loss associated with
the recession is huge, but the loss at the household level is not as large
because an effective system is in place to replace the income lost during a
recession. This point is consistent with the ﬁnding by Parker and Vissing-
Jorgensen in their paper for this conference, that everybody except the
very rich is fairly well insulated from extreme income ﬂuctuations.
Brian Jacob stressed the importance of individual state responses and
perhaps also of the part of the federal response that takes place through
other mechanisms besides transfers. It may be that the total costs of assis-
tance have not really been reduced dramatically if these other things are
included. Also, it might be that some states are being generous in other
ways that minimize any negative effects of welfare reform.
Christopher Jencks observed, following on Jacob’s point, that the fed-
eral government spends more on the EITC than was ever spent on AFDC,
and so it would not be accurate to say that welfare reform has saved the
government money. Rather, money was shifted away from cash welfare in
order to make it pay to go to work. In some sense welfare reform can be
called a success only if one ignores the effects on people’s well-being and
considers only the goal of getting people to work. Jencks also pointed out
that the reason the EITC is the most effective program in raising people
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because it tends to help those already close to the poverty line.
Jencks noted that applying for benefits under TANF can be difficult.
In many states, applicants are required to inquire about work from a list of
firms before applying. Some who were probably eligible, in terms of
genuine economic need, never come back. State welfare offices discour-
age people from applying, particularly when they do not want caseloads to
rise. In the 1980s New York went so far as to close half its welfare ofﬁces.
Simply counting applications can thus make it look like the need for
welfare has collapsed even if actual eligibility has risen.
Bruce Meyer argued that it makes more sense to evaluate a program
in terms of the reduction in the poverty gap it achieves. The effect of food
stamps, for example, on the poverty gap is much more important than
that of the EITC. Meyer suggested that in focusing on the interaction of
welfare reform and unemployment, the paper was looking at a second-
order effect. The main effect, namely, on consumption by single mothers,
was an increase at almost all points of the distribution. For other outcomes
like health insurance coverage, many single mothers toward the bottom
have lost ground. They are also working more, which may have been the
goal of the reform, but getting these single mothers into the workforce was
itself costly.
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